Over 50 countries will be holding national elections in 2024, including the recently concluded one in Taiwan, and an impending Parliamentary election in Maldives. These will be conducted amidst highly charged cognitive environments involving aggressive domestic political posturing against their opponents. The cognitive domain is also marshalled by states against their adversaries and this phenomenon has been increasingly recognised and the threat has been acknowledged. However, the general perception about cognitive warfare has been restricted to its impacts on public opinion. This has resulted in finer nuances of the phenomenon being understudied.

It must be noted that Cognitive warfare does not restrict itself to a specific kind of target (civilian or military), a specific situation (war, peace, or the grey zone), or a specific medium (cyber operations or influence operations, etc.). Instead, Cognitive warfare covers a wide spectrum encompassing any and every activity that attempts to control the “cognition” of a specific target for achieving a political goal. When undertaken by State actors, these objectives are rooted in their interpretation of national interest, rendering every constituent element of the State vulnerable to manipulation, including the policy-making machinery.

To grasp the extent of vulnerability, it is useful to consider the elements that constitute a modern nation state. The necessary elements of a modern nation state comprise a defined territory, a population, a government, and sovereignty (also international recognition, although highly debated). However, in exploring Cognitive warfare, the Indian Arthashastra tradition on statecraft comes handy.

Kautilya’s Arthashastra bases its definition of a ‘rajya’ through the ‘saptanga-rajya’ concept. The theory visualises a ‘rajya’ founded on seven supporting limbs, or constituent elements referred to as the seven ‘prakṛtis’ of a state. The treatise dictates, “स्वामी-अमात्य-जनपद-दुर्ग-कोश-दण्ड-मित्राणि प्रकृतय (6.1.1), roughly translating as, “The king (svāmī), the minister (amātya), the territory and population (janpada), the fortified city (durga), the treasury (kośa), the military (daṇḍa), and the ally (mitra) are the constituent elements (prakṛtis) of the state."

Cognitive warfare targets each of these elements, aiming to undermine collective state power. Hence, each of these are vulnerable targets and need to be studied – contrary to the general perception of Cognitive warfare targeting the ‘janapada’ or the population alone.

Of particular interest within the policy-making machinery are three elements: the ‘svāmī’, the ‘amātya’, and the ‘daṇḍa’, corresponding to heads of states and governments, key ministers and bureaucracy, and military forces, respectively. Given their direct and active participation in policy making in any State, an influence on the cognition of either of these entities causes an immediate and lasting impact on State policy.

Recent case studies of such successfully undertaken initiatives by states like Iran and China have created ripples throughout the vulnerable states. The controversy surrounding the “Iran Experts Initiative” having meddled with policy making in powerful western democracies in the favour of the Iranian state by establishing presence in some of the most prestigious government circles in Europe and the United States presents a wake-up call regarding the depth of Cognitive warfare. The reported claims, although still under scrutiny, that it was instrumental in the JCPOA being signed under the Obama administration. Further, it is believed that Iranian agents had infiltrated into highly sensitive US government positions holding significant influence on US intelligence on Iran.

A step ahead, the Chinese work in a more elaborate fashion. Prominent cases include connecting with and hiring “former top civil servants, former ministers to various boards and positions” in many western democracies. Referred to as “elite capture”, the most infamous names have included David Cameron, the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who participated in the promotion work for China’s port city development project in Sri Lanka.

Apart from western democracies, several developing Asian and African states present similar examples primarily translating as active participation of those states in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) development projects –Maldives under President Yameen (and currently President Muizzu), Sri Lanka under President Rajapaksha, etc. It is notable that such nuanced, and subtle influence over policy makers holds the potential to strikingly influence policy making while the policy makers necessarily realising that they have been influenced.

Further, the International Liaison Department, established in 1951, is represented in the Chinese Communist Party and has since held the job of maintaining ties with political parties. Currently, it claims to have connections with approximately 600 political parties across 160 countries globally. Claiming these connections through seminars and conferences as part of the CCP’s “Party Diplomacy,” the ILD holds significant influence either directly over policy makers, legislators and their allies, or the opposition – in both cases having a reasonable influence over policy making.

While discussing such situational dilemmas when the ‘prakṛtis’ are vulnerable to external “seduction,” Kauṭilya in his Arthaśāstra, suggests acute surveillance among policy makers. He mentions four key vulnerabilities of the entities comprising the implementation machinery that make them “seducible”: piety, material ambition, lust, and fear. (1.10.3-1.10.9)

When the entities can be influenced by Adversary State such that the current policy making structures are genuinely detrimental to their national interest – out of their pious loyalty to securing their national interest, they will influence policy making. In other cases, more material benefits might drive such influence including monetary or political gains in the short-term, like those earned by political leaders in many states that allowed Chinese investments on infrastructure projects that were deemed to fail – with opaque deals surrounding such investments that often ended up as cases of corruption for personal gains of sanctioning authorities.

The case of massive corruption surrounding infrastructure deals in Maldives during Prime Minister Najib Razak is a case in point. While monitoring external intervention in policy making by influencing the cognition of policy makers and implementing entities, these four drivers serve as the guiding lamps that could be followed by states.

In conclusion, understanding policymakers as primary targets in Cognitive warfare is essential for safeguarding national interests. By recognizing and addressing vulnerabilities within the policy-making machinery, States can mitigate the influence of external actors and uphold sovereignty and autonomy in decision-making processes.

Ms. Tejusvi Shukla is Research Associate, Centre for Indian Knowledge Systems, Chanakya University.