Ocean governance and peaceful settlement of maritime boundary disputes in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is high priority for the Vietnamese government. This is borne out from the fact that in the last three decades since the ratification of the Convention on June 23, 1994 by the Vietnam’s National Assembly, the country has successfully addressed maritime boundary disputes with its neighbours.

Following up on its continuous efforts to delineate the continental shelf boundary 19 years ago, in December 2022, Vietnam and Indonesia finally reached an agreement to settle their EEZ boundary disputes. President Nguyen Xuan Phuc and President Joko Widodo have proclaimed that “After 12 years of intensive negotiations, Indonesia and Vietnam have finally concluded negotiations on the EEZ boundaries of the two countries based on the 1982 UNCLOS,”

Apparently, both leaders had discussed this issue in 2018 and Vietnam had requested that Indonesia “reconsider its policy of destroying foreign boats caught fishing illegally in its waters” after the latter decided to sink 86 Vietnamese-flagship boats, 14 from the Philippines and 20 Malaysian. Be that as it may, the two countries will now be able “to assert their respective sovereign international maritime rights and enforce their maritime interests.”

This agreement adds to the list of other successful agreements between Vietnam and its maritime neighbours; Malaysia (1995); delimiting the EEZ and continental shelf with Thailand (1997); Gulf of Tonkin with China (2000) and delimiting the continental shelf with Indonesia (2003); joint exploitation of fisheries with China in the Gulf of Tonkin (2004). Significantly, Vietnam had settled maritime boundary with Cambodia in 1982.

There are at least four important outcomes from the Vietnam-Indonesia EEZ agreement. First, is about illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing which has been “a hot issue” for both countries. There have been instances when law enforcement agencies of the two countries have clashed with each other over issues concerning their respective fishers. For instance, in 2017 an Indonesian officer was detained by the Vietnamese Coast Guard; in 2019, an Indonesian vessel collided with two Vietnam Fisheries Service ships; Indonesia destroyed 38 Vietnamese flagged vessels that were allegedly fishing illegally in 2019; and more recently, Indonesia Coast Guard arrested two Vietnamese fishing boats in March 2021.

Notwithstanding the above incidents, the Agreement would “create(s) stability in the area,” and help “strengthen the cooperation between Indonesia and Vietnam to patrol the area." It merits mention that in 2021 Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh ordered local governments to stamp out IUU fishing and the Vietnam’s Fisheries Resources Surveillance Department has been raising awareness about the maritime boundaries and international maritime laws among its fishermen.  

Second, the agreement sends a clear signal that Vietnam’s other maritime neighbours can resolve boundary disputes amicably in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS. It is hoped that this agreement will trigger other similar disputes that Vietnam has with the Philippines and Malaysia. According to Nguyen The Phuong, a Vietnamese security analyst the move “proves that ASEAN countries can settle maritime disputes amongst them.”

Third, the agreement is also a clear message to China that both Vietnam and Indonesia have rejected China’s claim on the entire South China Sea encompassed by its illegal “nine dash line” that has already been dismissed by the “Permanent Court of Arbitration” on 12 July 2016.

Although the details of the Agreement have not been made public, it has “raised China’s ire” and Beijing decided to deployed CCG 5901,its largest coast guard ship, near the Tuna oil and gas production area (output expected to peak at 115 million cubic feet of gas) which is administered by Indonesia. This lies within Indonesia’s EEZ and is only 13 kilometers from the Vietnamese EEZ. The production is likely to being in 2027 and a subsea pipeline will supply gas to Vietnam.

Fourth, the Agreement is also a step toward a “united Southeast Asian front against China’s unlawful maritime claims” and reinforces the need for conclusion of the Code of Conduct for South China Sea which has been languishing for over two decades.

Finally, both Vietnam and Indonesia should expect more aggressive Chinese reactions in the form of deployment of the Coast Guard and maritime militia and it is feared that China will not let the Vietnam-Indonesia agreement “go easily” and a “prolonged stand-off in the area” can be anticipated. In particular, Vietnamese and Indonesian fishers will have to be prepared for confrontation with the Chinese coast guard vessels masquerading as fishers.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Associated with Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.