There is continuity in Indonesia’s diplomatic leadership role in multilateral fora. After a successful G20 Presidency in 2022, Jakarta’s focus now shifts to the Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023. President Joko Widodo heralded this responsibility by a “Kick Off” event in Jakarta and pronounced his country’s theme of the ASEAN Chairmanship i.e. “ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth”. Although the ASEAN focus is on “maintain (ing) economic growth”, President Joko Widodo categorically stated that the grouping remains committed to “contributing to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region”,

In the context of the latter, during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting earlier this month, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi noted that the bloc had discussed issues concerning the ASEAN’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as also Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea. Furthermore, the ASEAN Members are committed to “conclude the negotiation of the COC as soon as possible” clearly suggesting that there are no difference among them over the issue.

However Indonesia faces multiple challenges during its Chairmanship of the ASEAN and it would require smart diplomacy to push the CoC discussions into higher gear. Jakarta has drawn plans to host several rounds of negotiations with China on the COC this year, and the first discussion is scheduled in March. According to Sidharto R. Suryodipuro, Director of ASEAN cooperation at Indonesia's foreign ministry, “New approaches” with their Chinese counterparts will be explored to resolve the South China Sea disputes.

It is well known that the South China Sea is at the heart of disputes between China and some of the ASEAN claimant states i.e. Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam. Although Indonesia does not claim any features that are in dispute, its Natuna Islands are geographically part of the South China Sea and in dispute with China. Beijing has resorted to aggressive posturing and mobilized its navy, coast guard and more recently the maritime militia to enforce its “nine dash line” claims. The Philippines in particular has been at the receiving end of Chinese aggressive posturing during the last two to three years.

Earlier this month a Chinese Coast Guard vessel flashed military grade laser at the Philippines Coast Guard vessel operating 12 nautical miles from Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands. On its part, China has defended and asserted that its vessel “acted in a professional and restrained” manner, and accused the Philippines vessel of intruding in its waters. The disappointment in Philippines is quite visible given that the incident comes close on the heels of the state visit to China by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. It does not come as a surprise that the US did not miss the opportunity to react to the “laser incident” and called the Chinese actions as “provocative and unsafe”.

China is also concerned about the growing US presence in the region through the recent US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that will facilitate positioning US military and equipment in Philippine military camps. The US, according to a scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, is “trying to drive a wedge between China and regional countries”. The Director General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry is of the view that if China and the ASEAN “can stay focused and do things that are conducive to peace and stability in the South China Sea, any external interference will not be successful”.  

China also sees US military buildup in the western Pacific as a challenge to its regional ambitions and Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland is its national priority. The US is currently in an overdrive to build robust offensive and defensive capabilities in the western Pacific to ensure strategic ascendency. Apparently ASEAN countries welcome the US presence in the region in the hope that the Quad and the AUKUS can potentially divert China’s attention away from the South China Sea. In that case, there are fears that China may choose to slowdown discussions to finalize the “single draft negotiating text”.

Overall the situation remains grim and it is ASEAN hope that the CoC would be a useful tool to calm the region. Above all, the ASEAN does not want to be caught in a position of choosing between the US and China.

Indonesia, as the current Chairman of the ASEAN, has to “put its best foot forward” to work towards a robust and enforceable CoC. While that is what ASEAN member states wish and hope for, the current state of relations between China and the Philippines could act as “spoil sport”.

Be that as it may, ASEAN countries will experience favourable economic growth and attract investment from across the globe. Furthermore, ASEAN member states will continue to draw economic gains from China led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as also from the US driven Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Associated with Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.