Dr Vijay Sakhuja
It is surprising that Russia has decided to explore sale of military hardware to Myanmar given that it is currently fighting a full-fledged war against Ukraine. Media reports note that military delegations from both sides met back to back in Naypyitaw and Moscow. First, a 20-member Russian delegation made a secret visit to Myanmar June 13 to 19. It was led by Vice-Admiral Vladimir Lvovich Kasatonov, the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy. Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the Russian delegation was the presence of a representative of Russian state-owned arms exporter Rosoboronexport.
Soon thereafter, on 20th June, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, commander-in-chief of Myanmar’s armed forces arrived in Moscow and spent a week in Russia during which he also attended the international Maritime Defence Show in St. Petersburg. Apparently, he was shown around “submarines, frigates, corvettes, patrol vessels, including other types of ships,” This substantiates that a naval deal may be taking place soon. It is useful to mention that Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has been a frequent visitor to Russia, and this was his seventh visit to Russia in his military career.
Defence cooperation is one of the important pillars of Russia-Myanmar bilateral relations and several-diverse military weapons and systems have been supplied to the Myanmar military. Russia has generously provided military training and university scholarships to over 7,000 Myanmar military officers and personnel.
According to Stockholm International Research Peace Institute (SIPRI) data, between 1999 and 2018, Myanmar acquired nearly 39% of its total arms imports that is valued at nearly $1.5 billion. In recent times, contracts for supply of Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems, Orlan-10E reconnaissance drones and radar equipment; the latter is valued $14.7 million worth have also been signed. Russia could also supply six Su-30 fighter jets which are part of the 2018 agreement worth $200 million.
Although Russia and Myanmar cooperation is well established, at least two issues associated with the above deal merit discussion. First is about Russia’s capacity to supply military hardware to friendly countries given that it is currently fighting a war against Ukraine. By all accounts, Russia is low on its military inventory and its military industrial complexes are under great pressure to ensure that supply chain of military materials and spares are in good shape to win the war given that the US and its allies are equipping Ukrainian military with high end military equipment. It is fair to assume that this is a long drawn war and would require Russian military factories to continuously produce and equip the Army, Navy and the Air Force.
Second is about China. In the past, it has been a major supplier of military hardware to Myanmar. Also, it is well known that Chinese supplied military hardware is on friendly terms. Beijing has made known that it supports the current military regime in Myanmar and Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister has offered unequivocal political support and “deepen exchanges and cooperation” … “no matter how the situation changes,”
In the above context, Myanmar has choices to acquire military hardware either from Russia or China. Last year, in December, Myanmar acquired a refurbished Ming-class submarine and christened it UMS Minye Kyaw Htin. But this contrasts with Indian transfer of a Russian origin Kilo class submarine that had been in the inventory of the Indian Navy for nearly two decades.
This also lends a question- Are Russia and China competing over military sales to Myanmar? Russia has been selling military hardware to some Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam which now has large numbers of Russian military platforms in its inventory; Malaysia operates Russian fighter jets; and Indonesia has infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers of Russian origin.
Philippines is not inclined to acquire military hardware from Russia as it now has a favourable Philippine-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which facilitates not only large-scale joint military exercises but also sale of military hardware. Cambodia and Lao PDR have chosen China, while Singapore and Thailand have traditionally prefered US military hardware barring Thailand’s recent decision to acquire submarines, contract for which is in jeopardy due to financial constraints. Above all, many of the Southeast Asian countries have diversified their sources of military acquisition (Japan, South Korea, India, France, Germany, Israel, etc.) and appear to be quite satisfied.
Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Consultant Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.