The recent visit by foreign minister Yang Yi to countries of East Africa (Eritrea, Kenya and Comoros) and South Asia island nations (Maldives and Sri Lanka) is yet another attempt by China to consolidate its influence and establish a stronger politico-diplomatic-economic foothold in the region. In this context, China is planning to constitute a “China-Indian Ocean Council”, “presumably a collection of Indian Ocean countries who would form a collective discussion bloc”.

According to report published by Dazen Shira & Associates, a business consultancy firm which focusses on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the proposal is “still to be formalized”. Also, it is still not clear if the five countries mentioned above would be part of this minilateral arrangement but it should be of interest to regional countries particularly India.

The above report also notes that this initiative is much different from the China & Eastern European Countries (CEEC) established in 2012 to serve as a platform for cross-regional cooperation in diverse areas including “economy and trade, culture, education, youth exchange, agriculture, tourism, science and technology, health, think-tank exchange and sub-national cooperation”. The CEEC comprises of 16 Member States and 5 Observers, and involves Summit level meetings; nine such meeting have been held since 2022 barring 2020, apparently due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Be that as it may, the Chinese plans to constitute the “China-Indian Ocean Council” merits attention from at least three perspectives. First, China has been assiduously seeking a role in the existing multilateral/minilateral organisation/groupings in the Indian Ocean region such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA); South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM); Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC); Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) Initiative; and Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and other sub regional groupings that symbolize multilateralism in the Indian Ocean region.

Among these the IORA is the only pan-Indian Ocean multilateral grouping and China enjoys the status of Dialogue Partner along with nine other non-regional States. It signed a MOU with the IORA Regional Centre for Science and Technology Transfer (IORA RCSTT), and hosted the Second Blue Economy Core Group Workshop “Maritime Connectivity and Financing for Development in the Indian Ocean Rim”, Qingdao City, Shandong, in July 2016. Significantly, it has on regular basis provided financial assistance to the IORA headquarters. Likewise, China is an Observer in the IOC since 2016.

Second is about the BRI which now involves 140 countries with investments exceeding US$ 4 trillion in infrastructure projects and sovereign loans. China’s footprint through the BRI is already visible in nearly all Indian Ocean littorals expect Australia and India. Beijing is conscious of the numerous adverse tags (creditor imperialism and debt-trap diplomacy) that BRI projects in the Indian Ocean have attracted amid fears that host counties may partially lose sovereignty and control of area where infrastructure is being developed. In particular, China’s 21st century Maritime Silk Road has prompted international concern and is seen as both symbolic and substantive initiative of the above narrative. President Xi Jinping has attempted to assure the international community that the BRI has a benign intent and that China will enhance friendship and cooperation with all countries involved in the BRI on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. However, the BRI projects are seen as symbols of ‘benevolent economic development with covert strategic-military intent’. While China’s economic and development intents through the BRI merit acknowledgement, the imbedded strategic footprint of the Initiative is premised on power and interest maximization laying the foundations of regional and global hegemony. It is this notion that China has now begun to address and the “China-Indian Ocean Council” could be a symbolic of this approach.  

Third, China sees India as its top competitor in the Indian Ocean region and perceives it as a stumbling block to its ambitions to play a significant role in the Indian Ocean multilateral groupings. It has chosen to engage many other large regional groupings such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) wherein China is committed in the continent through trade and infrastructure loans. In 2021, China-African trade increased by 38% and in coming times it will be able to penetrate deeper into Africa as infrastructure improves. It has plans for US$300 billion worth of imports from Africa over the next three years including opening customs “green lanes” for African agricultural exports to China. The African nations are also hoping to benefit from RCEP in which China is a leading economy and “African components can be sourced and resold onto the RCEP markets”. Similarly, GCC member states are China’s ‘strategic economic partnerships’ and have joined the BRI.

Be that as it may, for New Delhi, a new situation is evolving in which an extra regional power is attempting to set up a minilateral grouping and could even drive its agenda. It is worth mentioning that in current times, minilateralism is gaining popularity as against multilateralism given the latter is quite unwieldy and at times can get unmanageable. India is conscious of the limitations of multilateralism and Indian foreign minister has observed that the “days of unilateralism were over, bilateralism has its own limits and multilateralism is simply not working well enough”.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Consultant Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.