Dr Vijay Sakhuja
The current Indo-Pacific discourse is highly skewed towards great power competition involving the US and China. It is marked by military infrastructure buildup-operational manoeuvers in the western Pacific and ‘flag showing missions’ by extra regional powers. Consequently a variety of bilateral and multilateral groupings based on convergence of interests are mushrooming and adding to regional insecurity and instability. Among these groupings, the Quad (Australia, India, Japan and the US) has held Summit level meeting to discuss the above dynamics to determine strategic responses to Indo-Pacific geopolitical and geostrategic escalatory contestations.
Interestingly, the Quad Members have also been discussing other global challenges such as the COVID19 pandemic, climate change, resilient infrastructure, critical and emerging technologies, cyber security and space. This was evidenced during the first ever in-person Leaders’ Summit of the Quad in September 2021. Prime Minister Scott Morrison of Australia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, and Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga of Japan and President Joe Biden of the US agreed to deepen ties and advance practical cooperation on multiple yet diverse 21st century challenges including combatting the climate crisis and called for decarbonisation of energy sources.
Among many issues associated with climate change, it was noted that Quad countries are “uniquely situated to deploy green port infrastructure and clean-bunkering fuels at scale”. Towards that end, it was decided to constitute a Quad Shipping Taskforce that will “invite leading ports, to form a network dedicated to greening and decarbonizing the shipping value chain”. The Task Force is also mandated to examine low-emission or zero-emission shipping corridors and establish a Quad Clean-Hydrogen Partnership. In fact ‘Green hydrogen’ is the new oil and can potentially help the global commitments of net-zero emissions by 2050.
The linkage between climate and shipping is well known given that the shipping sector is responsible for about 3% of global greenhouse gasses (GHG). It has been noted that if “shipping sector were an independent country, it would be the sixth largest emitter in the world”.
The international maritime community including governments, the private sector and civil society have endorsed the critical need to both transition and transform the maritime sector by decarbonising through alternative sources of clean energy such as electric, hydrogen, wind, methanol, etc. Consequently, in November 2021, during COP26, twenty countries including Australia, Japan and the US signed the Clydebank Declaration.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has also acknowledged the need to reduce the carbon footprint of the international shipping and its GHG strategy envisages reduction in CO2 emissions across international shipping, by at least 40% by 2030, 70% by 2050, compared to 2008 levels. This strategy is being supported by a slew of policies adopted under the IMO’s pollution prevention treaty (MARPOL); the energy efficiency design index (EEDI), which is mandatory for new ships; and the ship energy efficiency management plan (SEEMP). It also involves new fuels that would be a combination of hydrogen, ammonia, or electricity from renewable sources.
One of the ways to reach the above IMO targets is through “green corridors” i.e., specific trade routes between major port hubs where zero-emission solutions are supported. It has been argued that “Green corridors could be the tipping point for the development of the green maritime solutions.”
According to a report, the prefeasibility studies have identified “Australia–Japan iron-ore” route and the “Asia–Europe containership” route as possible Green Corridor. These could potentially accelerate decarbonisation of the shipping industry as also “provide stakeholders with the confidence to invest, coordinate, and deliver solutions at scale by 2030”.
Route “Saudi Arabia-China (Methanol)” was assessed as potential Green Corridor based on a “hypothesis that vessel types can be more easily converted to run on zero emission fuels due to their ability to use existing vessel-based storage facilities”; but China has not signed the Clydebank Declaration. “Saudi Arabia-India (Ammonia)” route was also considered for Green Corridor based on ‘existing vessel-based storage’, and like China, India too is not a signatory to the Clydebank Declaration.
Green Corridors also envisage bunkering ports that offer low-cost green hydrogen. India could emerge as a low-cost marine bunkering destination. There are however at least two challenges; first, the investments for setting up green hydrogen infrastructure is quite high and India would be keen to pursue solar and wind route for renewable energy. Second is the cost of green hydrogen; according to The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), the cost of green hydrogen production is $5-$6 per kg which may not be a viable option for global shipping. If India is able to produce clean hydrogen for marine bunkering (between US$ 1-2) it would be a good option.
In the above context, India has announced the National Green Hydrogen Energy Mission and plans to initially produce nearly one million tonnes green hydrogen annually by 2030. However, it would entail manufacturing electrolysers on a much larger scale in India.
One of the tasks of the “Clean-Hydrogen Partnership” includes technology development, delivery infrastructure and “stimulating market demand to accelerate trade in clean hydrogen in the Indo-Pacific region”. In the Indian context, Quad Shipping Task Force in consultation with national experts’ and energy majors such as Reliance could promote Green Hydrogen bunkering as part of the national Sagarmala Project and new-ship building programmes in the country.
Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Consultant Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.