Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech titled “For a Shared Future and Our Common Home” at the Special Summit to commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations. It was meant to reassure the ASEAN leaders that China is committed to “equality and harmonious coexistence” with its ASEAN neighbors i.e. living in harmony and not bullying. He emphasised that over the last three decades both partners had successfully “promoted common development and prosperity”, and “delivered better lives to the over two billion people”. Xi Jinping also announced the establishment of a China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership which should “inject new impetus into peace, stability, prosperity and development of our region and the world”.

Among the many issues that Xi Jinping alluded to in the rather long address, he did not shy away from making reference to regional security issues and urged both partners to pursue “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security” in the region. He also pressed for deepening “cooperation in areas such as defense, counter-terrorism, joint maritime search, rescue and exercise, countering transnational crime, and disaster management”. Xi also emphasised on joint efforts to “safeguard stability in the South China Sea and make it a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation”.

While Xi Jinping’s speech is laudable and notable from the perspective of diplomacy-security-economics-human security perspective i.e. building a “health shield” in the context of COVID-19 which continues to rage in China and some ASEAN countries, there are fears among the ASEAN Member States about China’s intentions in South China Sea as also the future of the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (CoC) of which a Single Draft Negotiating Text (SDNT) is still under discussion. They wish to see China ‘put actions’ to President Xi Jinping’s assurances i.e. demonstrate substantive practical actions and take concrete measures to build trust in the region in general and South China Sea in particular.

During the last two months, at least three ASEAN countries (two claimants and one non-claimant) have borne the brunt of China’s aggressive posturing and bullying at sea. The latest incident involves the Philippines in which Chinese coast guard ships cannon-sprayed and blocked two Philippine boats carrying supplies to troops deployed at the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. The Philippines threatened China that it could invoke its mutual defense treaty with the US, which prompted Washington to warn Beijing that it “stands with our Philippine allies in upholding the rules-based international maritime order and reaffirms that an armed attack on Philippine public vessels in the South China Sea would invoke U.S. mutual defense commitments,” Notwithstanding that, Philippines National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon has conveyed his country’s intentions to “continue the resupply and we do not have to ask the permission of anybody because that is within our territory,”

Likewise, Indonesia has accused the Chinese coast guard vessels of undertaking patrolling in its EEZ. These ships claim that they are within China’s “nine-dash line” and exercising their “right to patrol”. Furthermore, the Chinese coast guard vessels are “typically present to protect Chinese fishing vessels conducting illegal fishing within Indonesia’s EEZ”.  

Early last month, Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a four-page protest with the Chinese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur accusing China about the “presence and activities of Chinese vessels, including a survey vessel, in Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone off the coasts of Sabah and Sarawak”. It was also conveyed that the “presence and activities of these vessels are inconsistent with Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984, as well as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”.

At another level, in his speech, Xi Jinping also alluded to China’s support for ASEAN's “nuclear weapon-free zone” including its willingness to sign as early as possible the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast South Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). This is in response to the recent Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) submarine technology exchange under which Australia will acquire nuclear propelled submarines. During the regular press conference on September 29, 2021, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson had expressed concern that the AUKUS is a new military bloc and potentially “heighten geopolitical tensions”.

Be that as it may, China appears to be under pressure from the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy and regular Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP), the Quad Members (Australia, India, Japan and the US) exhibiting a clear desire to push back against China through numerous initiatives including military maneuvers in South China Sea, and the presence of the French naval forces, arrival of the UK Navy, and few European navies making forays into the South China Sea are discomforting for China. Under the circumstances, Beijing has chosen to extend a ‘warm up’ to the ASEAN and President Xi Jinping speech should be understood in that context.

The ASEAN has chosen to impress upon China the relevance and importance of the 1982 UNCLOS as the basis of settling disputes in the South China Sea, and the CoC should necessarily be consistent with the 1982 UNCLOS. Although the 2016 award (Philippines vs China) by the ITLOS was in Philippines favour, Manila failed to capitalize on it. Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei may be inspired by trends, particularly among smaller countries (Timor-Leste, Mauritius, Ukraine), to “meticulously employ legal procedures provided in international law to protect their interests from bigger states”.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Consultant Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.