The ASEAN has so far refrained from building “collective security” mechanism through military alliance such as the NATO. The Member States have even shunned the idea of joining the ‘Asian NATO’ proposed by Japan or the US led QUAD. In fact such formulations have been confronted a high decibel “chorus of resistance”. Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan has even dismissed the idea of being part of any military alliance by stating that "We are already ASEAN. We do not need NATO in ASEAN," If such is the ASEAN belief about “collective security”, it is fair to assume that the grouping is free from external pressures to join any military alliance. Also, the ASEAN collectively (ASEAN Plus 3; ASEAN plus 6, ADMM Plus; etc.) and member states individually are free to pursue respective foreign policy choices with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea who are now NATO partners and referred to as Indo-Pacific 4 or Asia Pacific 4.

There is yet another “collective security” block which appears to be still in an embryonic stage i.e. China, Russia, Iran and North Korea (CRINK), which is gaining visibility. Among the ASEAN, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar have built strong politico-diplomatic-strategic relations with China and Russia. Significantly, these countries do not have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea; likewise there no major differences with Russia, Iran and North Korea. Instead these countries are on the watch list of the US led west over issues of violation of human rights.

First Cambodia. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun, has observed that China and Cambodia relationship is symbolic of “iron-clad friendship” and China is “Cambodia’s biggest source of foreign investment and biggest trading partner for years running”. Cambodia also supports China over South China Sea issue and this was evident in 2016 when it succumbed to Chinese pressures and stalled the ASEAN statement on the South China Sea dispute. Phnom Penh has also benefitted from Chinese technical and financial support for the Ream Naval base and Dara Sakor International Airport which can also be used for military purposes. As far as Russia is concerned, the bilateral military relations are basic in nature. In 2024 General Mao Sophan had led the Cambodian military delegation to Russia and had emphasised that his country does not intend to build “defence relations or cooperation” for “making war, or threatening another nation or bloc,” 

As far as Lao PDR is concerned, the  2013 comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation with China has grown rapidly and contributed to the latter’s socio-economic development. Their militaries have conduced Friendship Shield-2024 joint exercises to “strengthen strategic mutual trust”, “practical cooperation” and “promoting regional peace and stability”. Interestingly, in July 2024, during the trilateral meeting between China, Russia and Lao PDR, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed concern over “rising hegemonism, unilateralism and protectionism” ostensibly referring to the West.

Myanmar has received military support from Russia including hardware. For instance, in 2022 Myanmar signed contract for 6 Su-30SME fighter jets for the Air Force and in 2024 both sides announced over 50 military cooperation activities. Myanmar has acquired $406 million worth of arms and equipment from Russian entities, and Chinese entities are known to have sold military hardware worth $254 million. According to reports, Russian origin aircraft such as MiG-29 jets, Yak-130 light aircraft Mi-35 helicopters have been used by the Myanmar military to conduct air strikes on civilian infrastructure. Also, the Russian Federation Navy conducted join the ‘second Myanmar-Russia joint maritime security exercise' in the Bay of Bengal. At the political level, Khin Yi, the chair of the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) proclaimed that Myanmar “strives to cooperate more closely in the field of anti-terrorism measures with our partner, the United Russia party," 

China has provided political and military support to the Junta, since the 2021 military coup and there are reports of “direct involvement in Myanmar's internal conflict”. This has triggered widespread “resentment among local communities and insurgents” amid fears of risks to the infrastructure connected with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a situation similar to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor which is bearing the brunt of the Baluchistan Liberation Army’s (BLA).

At another level, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, could well be the next three Southeast Asian contenders for BRICS given that these countries have close ties with both Russia and China and seek financial assistance from the BRICS bank.

In essence, Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR appear to be convinced that China and Russia are their most trusted supporters which is driving them closer to the CRINK block. They are beneficiaries of the Chinese Belt-Road Initiative (BRI), and several military related infrastructure projects are being developed with Chinese assistance. Likeiwse Russia has been a major source of military hardware for these countries.

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is Professor and Head, Center of Excellence for Geopolitics and International Studies (CEGIS), REVA University, Bengaluru and is associated with Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.