The ongoing Russia Ukraine war has witnessed deployment of classic armour and artillery, fighters and rotor-wing aircraft, modern platforms such as UAVs and drones, cruise and ballistic missiles, and more recently hypersonic missiles. These have challenged the belief that the future wars will only be high tech led by Industry 4.0 technologies; instead, there is now evidence to believe that it will be a generous mix of modern, not so modern, as well as futuristic weapons and platforms. The Russia Ukraine war is also characterized by land, sea and air warfare which is complemented by information warfare and satellite based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Another important facet of this ongoing war is the Russian choices of Gray Zone operations which blend both conventional as well as unconventional approaches to war fighting. The operational toolkit comprises of diverse actions (kinetic and non-kinetic) to cause damage to a belligerent i.e. Ukraine in this case. Furthermore, Gray Zone straddles the line between war and peace and in this context acts such as cutting undersea cables, using lasers against soft targets (humans), and damaging buildings are some of the actions that are representative of Gray Zone operations.

Gray Zone operations are gaining popularity in different geographies of the globe. For instance in the South China Sea, the Chinese law enforcement agencies and the maritime militia have engaged in coercive and intimidatory manoeuvers against the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and Indonesia maritime platforms and fishermen in the South China Sea to assert sovereign rights, enforce Fishery claims and access natural resources such as oil and gas. The Chinese toolkit is quite diverse and even includes high end weapons such as military grade lasers, or low level water cannons depending on the opponent. Chinese forces operate just below the “threshold” to achieve strategic objectives keeping in mind that their actions do not attract a military reaction-response from the opponent.

There are concerns that Russian choices of pursuing Gray Zone operations is impacting on the security of NATO countries. In a recent incident, a Russian merchant vessel Eagle S, an old tanker suspected to be part of Russia’s shadow fleet, has been arrested by the Finnish Coast Guard. The vessel was marshalled to Finland’s waters for causing an outage of the Estlink 2 undersea power cable. Apparently, the vessel had transited over the 658 megawatt undersea power cable connecting Finland and Estonia, dragged the cable nearly almost 62 nautical miles . It is averred that “through underwater research” the “drag mark in question” have been identified as that of “the Eagle S vessel”.

The Eagle S incident prompted Estonia to launch naval patrols to protect Estlink 1, a parallel electricity cable. Earlier, in an incident in 2022, the Nord Stream gas pipeline on the seabed between Russia and Germany was blown up and the incident is still under investigation. More recently, Yantar, a Russia auxiliary general oceanographic research vessel with underwater rescue capabilities was escorted out of the Irish waters on suspicions that it could engage in damaging underwater internet cables between Ireland and the UK.

Russia has dismissed Western and NATO allegations and insinuations, and called these as fake and fabricated and meant to malign the reputation of the country. Yet, EU foreign policy Chief Kaja Kallas has warned that the attacks on undersea cables in the Baltic Sea are not isolated incidents but are “part of a pattern of deliberate and coordinated actions to damage our digital and energy infrastructure.”

Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk has proposed that the Baltic Sea area be brought under the control of NATO, and littoral countries work “similar to the protection of our airspace”. NATO Secretary General has assured Poland that the issue will be accorded high priority and that the Alliance will “urgently work on a project for enhanced military control to ensure a secure Baltic”.

There is also a view that Russian hybrid attacks could trigger NATO Article 5 necessitating collective response i.e. “an attack on one is deemed an attack on all - and go to war with Russia”. Lithuania's former foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis has asserted that Russian “grey zone” activities can potentially attract invoking Article 5. According to James Appathurai, NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Innovation, Hybrid, and Cyber, incidents of hybrid attacks against NATO member states are reaching unprecedented levels since 2022 and are “utterly unacceptable”. Since the beginning of the Russia Ukraine war, according to Appathurai “We can definitely count dozens. Up to 100 for sure”. However it has not been all the way in favour of the Russians and many such plots were successfully foiled. He also warned Russia that “grey zone hostilities” could potentially “prompt an allied response, potentially involving military force”.

It remains to be seen if this warning will influence Russian choices of Gray Zone operations. By all counts, Russia can be expected to continue to pursue this strategy adding to the woes of the NATO and Baltic Sea littorals. A NATO strategy to protect critical underwater infrastructure also merits urgent attention.

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is Professor and Head, Center of Excellence for Geopolitics and International Studies (CEGIS), REVA University, Bengaluru and is associated with Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.