During the last few weeks the Chabahar port in Iran has hogged headlines in the Indian strategic discourse. Multiple perspectives have been proffered on how the port would give impetus to the 7,200 kilometers long International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multi-modal (ship, rail, and road) corridor connecting Mumbai in India to Saint Petersburg in Russia. The US’ adversarial reaction that “anyone considering business deals with Iran, they need to be aware of the potential risk that they are opening themselves up to and the potential risk of sanctions,” has also featured in the Indian politico-diplomatic debates and discussions. Dr. S Jaishankar, the Indian Foreign Minister, appears quite confident that the US would understand the multiple benefits that Chabahar port could bring to the region, and has pressed Washington not take a “narrow perspective” on the project.

While securing the 10-year contract to “develop and operate” the Shahid Beheshti Port Terminal in the Chabahar port is laudable, the Indian government should now pay attention to the development of Sabang port in the Aceh province of Indonesia. In 2018, both countries agreed to set up the India-Indonesia Infrastructure Forum (IIIF) to “foster collaboration between the private sectors of India and Indonesia” and “promote mutual benefit and explore opportunities for infrastructure development, including port projects”. Over a year ago, the Forum completed a joint feasibility study on the development of Sabang port.

The progress on the development of the Sabang port has however been sluggish barring the interest shown by the Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ). The project is estimated to cost over US$ 1billion and the “actual investment requirements will be worked out once the company reaches an agreement with Indonesian authorities to develop the port”.

It merits mention that the APSEX has a track record of port development projects overseas such as the Haifa Port in Israel. It is currently working with Sri Lanka's John Keells Holdings (JKH) and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority for the development of a deep-water shipping container terminal in the Port of Colombo for which the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has agreed to invest US$ 553 million. The APSEX is also exploring developing ports in East Africa (Kenya, and 30-year concession to operate and manage container terminal at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania), Vietnam, and the Mediterranean.

The Sabang port gains enormous significance for India from at least three perspectives. First, Sabang is ideally located to support short sea shipping in the Bay of Bengal i.e. it connects with Chennai (an important transshipment hub) for long distance voyages as well as other Bay of Bengal ports in India (Kolkata, Paradip, Haldia), Bangladesh (Chittagong) and Myanmar (Yangon, Dawei, Kyaukpyu). Second, Sabang can emerge as an important node for India–Indonesia “commodity driven trade or investments through projects” in the Bay of Bengal region. Third, a sister port agreement between Sabang and Port Blair can potentially be the catalyst to enhance India –Indonesia bilateral trade that is expected to touch US$ 50 billion by 2025.

However, there is a tendency among the Indian strategic community to see the Sabang port from military perspective targeted against China i.e. the port could be used for surveillance of the Malacca Strait; deploy warships for forays into the South China Sea; deter the PLA Navy from entering the Indian Ocean; etc. It is fair to argue that such military related activities are not needed given that Sabang is less than 100 kilometers from the Indian military base in the south of Great Nicobar Island (GNI). The naval and air bases at GNI coupled with a constellation of Naval Communication Network (NCN) Centres at INS Kohassa, INS Baaz and INS Kardip, are primed to provide “real time situational awareness and jointness in communication.”

At another level, the Indian and the Indonesian navies have institutionalized the biannual CORPAT, i.e. “coordinated patrols” in the Andaman Sea. Since 2002 the two navies meet every year which “help[s] build understanding and interoperability between navies, and facilitate institution of measures to prevent and suppress Illegal Unreported Unregulated (IUU) fishing, drug trafficking, maritime terrorism, armed robbery and piracy” Furthermore such interactions-engagements “enhance the operational synergy by exchange of information for prevention of smuggling, illegal immigration and for conduct of Search and Rescue (SAR) operations at sea.” For instance the 2024 India-Indonesia CORPAT concluded on 25 May 2024 at Sabang, Indonesia.

Under the circumstances, it would be unreasonable to seek assistance of Indonesia against China. Besides, Indonesia and China have a robust relationship at the bilateral level and through the ASEAN mechanism. Furthermore, in April 2024, President Xi Jinping assured the Indonesia's President-elect Prabowo Subianto that China is willing to “maintain close contacts, push the two countries' regional integrated economic corridor projects forward, and continue to deepen maritime cooperation”. This should put to rest any military expectations from Jakarta as imagined by the Indian strategic community.

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is Professor and Head, Center of Excellence for Geopolitics and International Studies (CEGIS), REVA University, Bengaluru, and is associated with Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.