A new politico-strategic minilateral grouping, nicknamed “Squad”, comprising of the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines is resonating among the strategic community. It has origins in the June 2023 meeting in Singapore (on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue) between the defence chiefs who emphasised the “shared vision” of “advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific”. US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin had noted that they also explored “opportunities to expand cooperation across our four nations, including in the South China Sea”.

Last month, in April 2024 the Squad members met in Washington, and Secretary Austin reiterated that the grouping “share(s) a vision for peace, stability and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” The meeting was followed by Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA) in the form of naval manoeuvers in the Exclusive Economic Zone of The Philippine with the aim to “strengthen the interoperability of our defense/armed forces doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures” and thereby “directly contribute to the security and stability of the region and build mutual understanding and interoperability between nations and our armed forces.”

The Indo-Pacific strategic community have debated the new grouping and appear upbeat that the Squad is a “natural outgrowth of a whole series of US-led minilateral initiatives with treaty allies, most notably the Australia–UK–US (AUKUS) and Japan–Philippines–US (JAPHUS) trilateral groupings”. Another view notes that both the Quad and the Squad are “many [arrows] in the U.S. quiver”; the former has “greatest value in peacetime” and the latter along with AUKUS and the U.S.-Japan alliance, will “prove to be far more important than the Quad” during “militarized crises and conflict with China”. Meanwhile it has also been argued that the Quad and the Squad can coexist i.e. “Squad could complement the Quad, leading to a more versatile distribution of power and responsibilities”.

The Chinese reaction to the Squad is not surprising and a professor at the China Foreign Affairs University observed that the “Squad has a stronger sense of direction, meeting the needs of the US to manage the security situation in the regions of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits”.

Be that as it may, the Quad members are receptive to the idea of other countries joining the Quad thereby showcasing the inherent “suppleness and flexibility”. It allows new Members to join the grouping and in this context, in 2019 the Philippines Navy had conducted manoeuvres in the South China Sea with the navies of India, Japan, and the US to “deepen the partnership and foster mutual understanding” and endorse the “friendship, partnership and cooperative engagement”.

Similarly, Exercise Pacific Vanguard held off Guam included South Korea besides the Quad members Australia, Japan, and the US but excluded India due to operational-geographical constraints.

Likewise, these is also scope for non-quad navies to ‘participate in’ and ‘partake from’ the Quad activities and sometimes even lead. Though not a member of the Quad, the France led Exercise La Perouse in the Bay of Bengal included Australian, French, Japanese and US navies.

Furthermore, the existing members of the Quad can absent themselves from the grouping based on respective national interests as is the case of India which is not part of the United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting (TDMM) which focusses on Taiwan Strait and cross-Strait issues.

Quad members have also set up “issue-based networks” such as the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) to diversify procurement and overcome the risks of overdependence on a single source which could result in disruptions. Similarly, the Blue Dot Network a regional infrastructure initiative that seeks to “promote quality infrastructure investment” is an “open and inclusive” which offers “transparent, economically viable, financially, environmentally and socially sustainable, and compliant with international standards, laws, and regulations” vis a vis the Chinese Belt Road Initiative (BRI) which is mired in issues of ‘debt trap’.

Interestingly, Japan is keen to join the Five Eyes Alliance (FVEY), an Anglosphere intelligence alliance which includes two Quad members i.e. US and Australia (besides Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom); however India decided to give it a pass due to its intrusive agenda particularly over issues of Human Rights, strategic autonomy and data privacy.

At another level, Australia, India, Japan and the US see the 5G alliance of democracies as an “alternative to Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, amid concerns about espionage and cyber security risks”.

It is fair to argue that the Quad and the Squad are attractive grouping for nations that hope to stand-up to Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Philippines has been at the receiving end of the Chinese intimidation-coercion and hopes that by joining the Squad it would prevent any adverse fait accompli.

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is Professor and Head, Center of Excellence for Geopolitics and International Studies (CEGIS), REVA University, Bengaluru, and is associated with Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.