The Horn of Africa region also known as the Somali Peninsula, has been in chaos for the last few decades. It has witnessed conflict, civil wars, and sea piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, the ongoing Houthi attacks from Yemen targeting the international shipping in the Red Sea have added a new dynamic to the region. These have triggered many countries to dispatch navies to the Indian Ocean to ensure safety and security for international shipping.

In the Horn region (Eretria, Djibouti and Somalia), Somalia has been in political turmoil after Somaliland declared itself as an independent Republic in 1991. Early this year on 01 January 2024, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with landlocked Ethiopia granting it access for fifty years to twenty kilometers of coastline overlooking the Gulf of Aden. In return, according to the MoU, Ethiopia will accord Somaliland recognition as a Republic. Furthermore, Ethiopia will be able to gain access to Port of Berbera for trade as also its naval vessels can operate in the Red Sea. It is worth mentioning that Ethiopia had lost access to sea in 1993 after it seceded from Eritrea following a war that lasted nearly three decades.

Rattled by the Somaliland initiatives toward independence-recognition, the Federal Somali Government has signed a ten-year defence agreement (ratified in February 2024) under which Türkiye naval vessels will undertake patrolling of its territorial waters as also provide training and equipment for the Somali navy. According to a Turkish defence ministry official, “Upon request from Somalia, we will provide support in the field of maritime security, as we did in the field of fight against terrorism …we will help Somalia develop its capacity and capabilities to combat illegal and irregular activities in its territorial waters.”

While the defence agreement would certainly benefit the Federal Somali Government, it will enable Türkiye make forays into the Indian Ocean. There are at least four plausible reasons which have encouraged Türkiye to examine Somali Government’s offer.

First, it is an opportunity for Türkiye to recall and showcase the glory of the Ottoman Empire (1300–1923) that had developed cultural, religious, economic, and diplomatic contacts with the communities of the Indian Ocean. Notably, Türkiye had control over few major entrepots of the Indian Ocean trade but had to contend with the Portuguese monopoly over the spice trade. Apparently, Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) provided both men and ships with which the Mamluks launched an assault on the Portuguese in India. The Ottomans had also forged an alliance with sultanate of Aceh in Sumatra in Southeast Asia.

Second, by all accounts, Türkiye is a middle power and intends to play an important role in the evolving politico-diplomatic, economic, strategic, and security dynamics in the Indian Ocean. It has not taken very kindly to the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) announced in 2023 at the G20 summit in New Delhi. Türkiye is part of the Chinese led Belt and Road Initiative and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not hesitate to claim that there is “no corridor without” without his country and argued that the “ most convenient route for traffic from East to West must go through Türkiye.” Instead, President Erdogan supports the Iraqi proposed 100 kilometers long Development Road linking Grand Faw Port in southern Iraq to Türkiye border and further extending into Europe.

Third, Türkiye military industrial complex which has so far served the national requirement and has even built an aircraft carrier, has enormous military technology capability potential. It has emerged as a major military export house for the Asian, African countries (Africa Defence Security and Aerospace Forum) and Gulf States. Turkey’s arms exports have witnessed phenomenal growth (27 per cent) from US$ 4.4 billion (2022) to US$ 5.5 billion (2023). In particular, the Bayraktar-TB2 drone is now in the inventory of several countries.

Fourth, Türkiye is also exploring defence and security cooperation in South Asia. The defence cooperation with Bangladesh is noteworthy and it has assisted in ammunition production and agreed to provide technical support to build patrol boats for the Bangladesh Navy and Coast Guard. Besides, over 3,000 defence officers, Special Security Force, Bangladesh Police, and Ansar have received specialised training in Türkiye as part of defence cooperation. In 2022, Bangladesh Armed Forces signed an agreement with Turkish manufacturer Baykar Technology to procure the advanced drone.

The longstanding Pakistan and Turkiye defence relationship has deepened over the decades and they hold bilateral military exercises. In particular the joint naval exercises feature patrolling in the North Arabian Sea, encompassing defence against asymmetric attacks, Visit Board Search & Seizure (VBSS), Air Defence Exercises and Joint Coordinated Patrol”. Türkiye has recently supplied Bayraktar TB2 drones to the Maldives to help the island nation’s maritime domain awareness and it is exploring military cooperation with Sri Lanka.

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is associated with Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi, and is Emeritus Professor of Research, SoA Center for Integrated Maritime Studies and Research (SOACIMSR), Siksha 'O' Anusandhan University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India.