The sharp, shrill and high decibel Indo Pacific strategic discourse is focused on the QUAD (Australia, India, Japan and United States), AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States), Chinese aggressive posturing in the South China Sea, PLA Navy’s presence in the Indian Ocean, EU naval deployments in the Horn of Africa, Iranian challenge to US in the Persian Gulf, and the ongoing Houthis attacks on the international shipping in the Red Sea.

The discourse appears to underestimate Russian naval presence in the Indo Pacific; in fact it is now a common sight to see Russian Federation Navy (RFN) in the region particularly in the Indian Ocean engaging in bilateral drills, trilateral exercises with navies of China, Iran and South Africa, making port calls, participating in international naval events such as MILAN hosted by the Indian Navy, as also showcasing Russian naval technological advancements at defence exhibitions such as DIMDEX-2024.

According to a Russian scholar, “We maintained a presence here during the Cold War. There was a special squadron which was part of the Pacific Fleet that oversaw Moscow’s operations in the Indian Ocean, including Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal,” … “We could possibly see one or two Russian naval squadrons focused on the region as it used to be case during the Cold War,”

During the Cold War the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron had access to naval facilities in friendly Indian Ocean countries in People's Democratic Republic of Yemen i.e. South Yemen (Aden port and anchorage in Socotra), off the Seychelles (semi-permanent mooring buoys), off Mauritius (along the Cargados Carajos), and in 1972 it had access to the Somali port of Berbera which “ acquired additional importance when Egypt expelled all Soviet advisers and cancelled basing rights, including Ras Banas along the Red Sea, in July 1972”. In essence, the Soviet Union had conducted sustained operations in the Indian Ocean until 1985.

In the post-Cold War period, Russia has been scouting for access and basing arrangements in the Indian Ocean. In 2017, Russia approached Sudan to establish Russian military infrastructure, and in 2020 both sides reached an agreement to allow Russia position 300 Russian military personnel, four ships in the Red Sea, including nuclear propelled vessels such as submarines on the shores of Suakin, 63 kilometers south of Port Sudan.

The agreement witnessed several ups and downs including the attempted coup in Sudan 2023, thereby “indefinitely” postponing the signing of the treaty. According to Andrei Chernovol, the Russian ambassador to Sudan “Due to the dissolution of parliament, the Sudanese side has not yet been able to complete the necessary internal ratification procedures”

This facility would have accrued at least two big advantages for the Russian Navy. First, it was meant to ensure Russian naval presence in the Red Sea-Indian Ocean; and second, Russian ships would be able to undertake maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) in the region and avoid long voyages back to homeports in Russia.

It is fair to assume that the absence of technical support-logistics can be a challenge for sustained deployment of the Russian Navy in the Indian Ocean. Naval vessels require regular inspections and ‘maintenance, repair and overhaul’ (MRO) to ensure that critical systems and components do not fail or malfunction. Furthermore, a ship’s war fighting efficiency should be at its top level, down time is less, and costly overhauls which add to operating costs are brought to the minimum.

At another level, Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean is also determined by a necessity to protect seaborne trade. The Joint Naval Exercise CHIRU involving China, Iran and Russia and its 2023 iteration - “Security Bond-2023” – included anti-terrorism and anti-piracy training and a simulated rescue mission of a hijacked merchant ship.

Russia has plans to connect the Northern Sea Route to the Indian Ocean. In his speech at the “One Belt, One Road” forum in Beijing in October 2023, President Vladimir Putin noted that Russia was engaged in “connecting Russian ports in the Baltic and Arctic with ports on the coast of the Persian Gulf (Bandar Abbas in Iran) and Indian Ocean”

India is fast emerging as MRO hub and till date three US Navy vessels have undergone repairs/maintenance at the state-of-the-art L&T shipyard at Kattupalli in Tamil Nadu on India's east coast. Mazagon Docks Limited, Goa Shipyard Limited and the Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) are primed to undertaking MRO for Russian naval vessels. It merits mention that Mazagon Docks Limited and the Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd (GRSE), Kolkata have constructed/refitted Indian warships that have Russian origin weapons and sensors including propulsion systems. The Indian maritime maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) capacities are quite significant and MRO arrangement can be a promising factor to enhance India Russia maritime cooperation.

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is associated with Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi, and is Emeritus Professor of Research, SoA Center for Integrated Maritime Studies and Research (SOACIMSR), Siksha 'O' Anusandhan University, Bhuvneshwar, Odisha, India.