It was raining accolades in support of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Speaking at the ceremony to mark ten years of the signing of the CPEC, Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif acknowledged that it had transformed the economic landscape of the country. Likewise, in his press briefing, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson informed that projects under the CPEC were “flourishing” and attracted “US$ 25.4 billion of direct investment, creating 192,000 jobs, producing 6,000 megawatts of electric power, building 510 kilometers of highways and adding 886 kilometers to the core national transmission network”. It was also announced that CPEC projects will be expedited as also expanded in various sectors including mineral resources, agriculture, information technology and newer special economic zones will be set up.

The CPEC links the Gwadar port in the Baluchistan province in Pakistan with Kashgar in landlocked Xinjiang in Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. It passes through Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, western Punjab Province and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. In 2013 the CPEC projects were valued at US$ 46 billion, and by 2020 the investment value was pegged at US$ 62 billion. In 2022, the Chinese investment in Pakistan rose to US$ 65 billion. While the investments in CPEC by China are notable, but it has not been a smooth sailing for the CPEC since signing. These are at least six reasons.

First, it was envisaged that the CPEC would be completed by 2018, but armed resistance by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) have impacted on the smooth progress of the projects. CPEC has not found favour in Baluchistan for political and social-economic reasons. The Baloch people have been pushing for an independent Balochistan which they argue was annexed by Pakistan in 1948. The federal government has been accused of coercing Khan of Kalat at the time of the accession agreement. The local Baloch population also feels alienated and blame the successive federal governments of poor treatment particularly by Pakistan’s Punjabi political elite and the military rulers.

Second, the Chinese government is worried about the safety of Chinese nationals (estimated to be about 60,000) who are working or managing various projects under the CPEC. Beijing has on regular basis urged the Pakistani government to institute necessary security measures. In 2019, according to media reports, Pakistan military had raised a “division-size force to protect the project and they were planning to deploy another division for this purpose”. In November 2022, President Xi Jinping during his talks with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who was in China on his maiden visit, expressed "deep concern" and had sought "reliable and safe environment" for the Chinese workers.

Third, there have been concerns regarding the safety of the Gwadar port. In 2019, the first ever consignment of cargo containers from Kashgar to Gwadar were loaded onboard MV Cosco Willington and MV Al-Hussein and the two vessels were escorted to international waters by the Pakistan Navy ships. The Pakistan Navy has been specifically tasked to increase patrolling of the port and according to Vice Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbassi, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff Operations, “providing security to CPEC on land as well as making its maritime prong safe is vital for the projects’ success. In this regard, ensuring maritime security remains an important responsibility of Pakistan Navy which is set to grow in the coming years”.

Fourth, Iran (Shiite Muslim country), though not directly associated, has interest in the security of the CPEC from the point of stability in Balochistan. Iranian forces are fighting the domestic Sunni militants who get support from Sistan-Baluchistan province in Pakistan. Iran has been urging Pakistan to take the issue seriously and control subversive elements who engage in cross-border terrorism into Iran. China has now taken the initiative and set up of a trilateral security mechanism between China, Pakistan and Iran which “reflects their shared concerns regarding security in Baluchistan,"  

Five, Chinese deep sea fishing vessels have been docking in Pakistani harbours and have displeased the Pakistani fishermen who said that “commercial fishing vessels and bottom trawling would deplete fish stocks in the exclusive federal sea zones off the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan”. Further, Chinese “vessels threaten the livelihoods of small fishers by depriving them of catch today, and in future by ecologically destroying the sea.” Aslam Bhootani, who represents Gwadar in the National Assembly, too raised the issue in the legislature and said that the “Local fishermen of Gwadar do not stand a chance against these Chinese vessels, and that is why we oppose them,”

Six, Gwadar port is at the heart of strategic contestation involving China, US, India and now Russia. The port is also seen as naval facility to support PLA Navy’s presence in the Indian Ocean and can potentially catapult China to play the Great Game in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the Chinese space and communication infrastructure in Pakistan i.e. 820 kilometers long cross-border Pakistan-China Fiber Optic Project (PCFOP) and the Chinese Beidou satellite tracking station in Karachi could facilitate military espionage add to digital security concerns.

Finally, CPEC attracts numerous domestic and external security challenges, and safety and security of the projects remains high on Beijing’s agenda. This is not withstanding the near continuous increase in Chinese investments in CPEC.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Associated with Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.