In February this year the Indonesian state held its general elections, to elect representatives to both the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly); the DPR (People’s Representative Council); the DPD (Regional Representative Council); and the DPRD which is the provincial/ district level elections. This massive exercise combines both the central legislature and the provincial ones leading to nearly 20,000 elected representatives. During the Presidential elections, Prabowo Subianto was elected with approximately 59% of votes, leading to his emergence as the winner in the countries 5th direct presidential election since 2004.

As Indonesia’s presidential elections takes place by electing the dual posts of both President and Vice President running as a team, the elections were even more critical as it coupled an unusual pair – the former Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the eldest son of the outgoing President Joko Widodo, a combination that was hitherto unconceivable given the divergent political approaches these two individuals represent. Prabowo’s earlier attempts at the presidency in 2009 as Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Vice-Presidential candidate and in 2014 and 2019 as the opponent to Joko Widodo, remained unsuccessful, though his political career continued. His claim to political legacy in Indonesia dates back to the Suharto years, whereas the son-in-law of President Suharto, he was closely associated with the Golkar party and the military leadership that governed Indonesia for more than three decades. Prabowo’s past links to the Suharto regime naturally raise questions on the kind of leadership that he would provide, raising some important challenges for the next five years, as discussed below.

First, relates to Prabowo’s erstwhile role both within the Golkar and as the head of Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command). Both these organisations, closely related to the military rule, exemplify the level of military entrenchment during the Suharto years and Prabowo’s political legacy is built on these foundations. His electoral victory has raised concerns surrounding the future of democracy, human rights, justice and accountability. In the past, Prabowo’s involvement in the May 1998 riots, which marked the collapse of the Suharto era that led to the deaths of many pro-democracy student activists is a clear example of the kind of measures he is capable of.

Moreover, his legacy during his tenure in the Kopassus National Army Special Forces reflects the negative human rights record, where both in 1983 and later in 1999, the excesses of the Indonesian armed forces was visible in its approach to the East Timor conflict, where several anti-Indonesian protestors were killed during Indonesia’s military occupation of East Timor. As in other countries where human rights excesses have occurred, the inability to ensure accountability for the violations reduces the vibrancy of the democratic process. Since accountability for those crimes remain elusive, it also has implications for the kind of democracy that Indonesia may witness over the next five years. Interestingly, East Timor’s political leadership has taken the steps to congratulate the president elect and has also stated on record that the past history with Indonesia will not impact the furthering of bilateral ties under the Prabowo presidency. Moreover, as East Timor is slated to enter the ASEAN as a full member, its political relations with Indonesia and other ASEAN members will be critical to watch as the roadmap to its membership has been clearly articulated by the ASEAN processes.

The second issue relates to the question of economic recovery and whether Prabowo will continue the reforms adopted by his predecessor, Jokowi. The COVID-19 crisis did not spare Indonesia from suffering an economic decline, where the country’s GDP declined by nearly 7% in 2020 compared to 2019, as stated in the macro trends, a website indicting the shifting GDP’s of nations. However, the World Bank Overview for the country suggests that the Indonesian economy was able to pull itself out of recession through Joko Widodo’s recovery plans, allowing a GDP growth rate of about 5% every year since then and a low inflation rate. Indonesia still relies heavily on imports from other countries; it was thus Jokowi’s target to rely more on the domestic economy.

One of the sectors where the economic impact is likely to see a clear shift is in the manufacturing of nickel batteries for electric vehicles, which is a high demand sector and can impact the economy enormously. As one of the richest nickel producing countries in the world, Indonesia is in demand for the importing of nickel. In order to create a supply chain for electric vehicle batteries, Jokowi imposed a nickel ore export ban, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) into that sector. Additionally, the country has spent more on infrastructure, creating jobs and better living conditions. This has led to only 9.6% of the population living in poverty, half of the 1999 rate, according to World Bank reports. By keeping the GDP-to-debt ratio and inflation low and stimulating domestic consumption, Prabowo not only hopes to stabilise the economy by following his predecessor’s footsteps, but actually aims to pull the country out of the middle-income category by assuring that the economic growth will increase by 8%.  

Thus, it is through the continuity and strengthening of Joko Widodo’s infrastructure investment, domestic production and consumption and innovation that Prabowo’s presidency aims to pull Indonesia out of the middle-income trap and make it one of the fastest growing economies in the world. This focus on the economy will also receive additional impetus from the Vice President Gibran, as Jokowi’s legacy on the economic front will see a semblance of continuity under the Prabowo-Gibran combination too.

Third challenge that the Prabowo administration will face relates to the management of the coalition politics that has been the core feature of Indonesia’s democratic consolidation. In the Feburary elections the largest vote share has gone to the PDI-P (16.72%), followed by Golkar (15.29%) and then Gerinda. Prabowo heads the Gerinda which has received the third highest vote share of 13.22 %.

Between February and June this year, a massive exercise took place bringing together several political groups in an effort to garner support for Prabowo’s presidency. In the run up to the elections the Prabowo coalition consisted of what is popularly known as the Advanced Indonesia Coalition or Koalisi Indonesia Maju (KIM). This grouping was represented by two major political parties, the Gerinda headed by Prabowo and the National Awakening Party (PKB). In the run up to the elections, both the Golkar and the National Mandate Party (PAN) threw its weight behind Prabowo lending greater political heft to the Gerinda campaign. The political shifts and machinations since February have seen interesting surprises bringing several groups together.

With ten parties clearly supporting his presidency, including the Nasdem party that had originally backed his rival, Anies Baswedan, an ideological position that is described as a “big tent” fostering three main approaches to politics such as the reliance on the Pancasila, a nationalist outlook for Indonesia and a right of centre approach to security and economic issues is now clearly visible. Finally, in terms of Indonesia’s security and the strategic challenges in the region, the Prabowo administration will show continuity with his predecessor on being strongly nationalistic in its foreign policy strategies. Indonesia’s dual pillars of “bebas dan aktif” or a free and active foreign policy is based on a position of neutrality. This will be clearly articulated by maintaining an equilibrium in the ongoing US-China rivalry in the region while Indonesia’s aspirations to fulfil its regional leadership role within the ASEAN framework remain at the forefront.

On some key issues the shifts will be noticeable. ASEAN’s management of the Myanmar crisis will remain a litmus test for the leadership. Prabowo’s own military legacy should not influence his approach to the Myanmar question which remains tenuous. On the South China Sea conflict and the Chinese assertions in the maritime spaces, the administration will clearly highlight Indonesia’s sovereign rights in the region.

Moreover, with emerging security mechanisms such as the AUKUS, the administration will not be too concerned, as it implies greater regional balancing and more engagement with multiple players. As long as Prabowo does not see a threat to Indonesian democracy, regional security will continue to be approached in a cautious and non-aligned manner, focusing on national interest and an Indonesia first approach.

Ms. Leela Boudjema is a research scholar at the Asian-Pacific Studies at Sciences Po, Paris and Professor Shankari Sundararaman is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.