In early August, I authored a column for the Kalinga International Foundation (KIF) in which I had looked at the July 2023 elections in Cambodia, focusing on the slide back to the democratic process that resulted from an uneven electoral system that did not even permit opposition leaders a clear voice. This led to a reflection on the nature of democratic deficit in the region, which has amply been supported by two articles I contributed last year to the KIF which highlight the electoral processes in both the Philippines and Malaysia.

This current article will focus on how the domestic political situation in Thailand has evolved since the May 2023 elections, which initially ushered in a new phase of hope for Thailand, but remained unfulfilled as the electoral verdict was not adhered to. In the months following the elections, the verdict of the people has been met with stiff resistance from the ruling elite that prefers to have a pro military-monarchy supported political grouping to head the country, rather than allowing for any forms of genuine political reforms to enter the political process.

The run up to the May 2023 elections in Thailand was heralded in early March when the Thai monarch dissolved parliament and announced fresh elections after a period of four years. The electoral campaign was unusual in that the Move Forward Party (MFP), which was not considered a front runner, particularly in comparison to the Pheu Thai party, managed to capture a wide audience. Some of the campaign agendas it supported captured the imagination of sections of society opposed to the military and the monarchy. As a party that is left of centre and known to have a progressive approach, the party foundations can be traced to 2014. An earlier avatar of the MFP, was the Future Forward party which was abolished by a Constitutional Court order.

The campaign led by Pita Limjaroenrat was critical of the role played by the Thai military and its vested interests in the country’s business enterprises which allowed sections of the military to have untapped access to commercial interests and the financial markets in Thailand. The campaign critically addressed these issues delving into the depths of Thai crony capitalist interests hitting the military monarchical support base at the roots of the Thai political system. Moreover, Thailand follows a practice of compulsory conscription, the abolition of which was one of the agendas of the MFP. The Thai electorate, fatigued with the lack of changes, delivered an unexpected resounding vote to the Move Forward Party. The Party won 151 of the seats in the House of Representatives which was the highest vote share of any party and initially made a bid to form the government through a coalition formation.

However, on 13 July 2023, attempts to secure the Prime Ministerial vote did not go through as Pita received only 324 votes, with the Senate giving him only 13 votes out of 250. In the second attempt at the office of the PM, Pita was debarred by a procedural vote wherein parliament did not allow his name to be nominated for the Prime Minister’s post a second time. The moves to appeal the procedural vote in the Constitutional Court did not succeed after the court rejected the petitions that were supporting the candidacy of Pita.

What is interesting about the Thai system of voting is that candidates can vote for the individual or the party in a particularly constituency. The Thai House of Representatives has 500 seats of which 400 are directly elected through an individual candidate standing for the seat. The remaining 100 are called Party list voting where 100 seats are earmarked for the political party without a candidate being present. So in 400 constituencies individuals are selected and in 100 the political party is voted for. This allows people without prior political experience to become Members of Parliament, as the party can reward these seats to loyal supporters.  

The Senate comprises of 250 members who are nominated by the military junta. As a result the entire Senate is a pro-military/ monarchy grouping, with a strong conservative political view. Secured by the nominations, this becomes a homogenous group of political supporters that rally behind a more traditional outlook on political stability, which does not necessarily bring about liberal democratic reforms that are capable of ushering in effective changes to the democratic process. The selection of the Prime Minister becomes even more problematic since the combined strength of both the House and Representatives and the Senate cast the vote for the Prime Minister. This is selected by a simple majority and whoever wins 376 votes out of 750 votes cast is appointed as the PM. While the Senate holds sway of the 250 votes, its backing is critical for a candidate to be able to contest for the post of PM.

On 22 August, after months of uncertainty and constitutional maneuvers the Pheu Thai party that was initially founded by Thaksin Shinawatra, and has been in the political fray for more than two decades, has formed a coalition with other parties supported by the military to form a government with Srettha Thavisin at the helm of affairs as Prime Minister. This move is more unusual as Thavisin is not formally an elected Member of Parliament. The Thai Constitution also allows non-members to be elected as the country’s Prime Minister which in itself is a rather unusual position. While Thavisin will head a coalition government that will be supported by the military in the background, it will remain challenged in any effort to being about concrete changes to the political system. In this environment of political uncertainty Thaksin Shinawatra himself returned to Thailand after a self imposed exile of 15 years only to be arrested and jailed. Both Srettha Thavisin and Shinawatra represent huge business interests within Thailand, pushing the interests of the business groups and the military into a closer nexus. What this clearly heralds is that former rivals, the Pheu Thai party and the military are now clearly in cahoots with each other.

Professor Shankari Sundararaman is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.