Even as the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has been on for a month, the impact of the global responses and how states have begun to address the crisis is coming into focus. The ASEAN has been particularly relevant in some senses, as Russia and ASEAN completed three decades of engagement in 2021. As the Ukraine crisis unfolds, it is imperative to look at how certain regional mechanisms led by ASEAN, have responded to the crisis. Among the several ASEAN mechanisms such as the ARF, ADMM Plus and the EAS, the latter comes critically into focus. There are several issues that need to be factored in to understand ASEAN’s strategic silence on the Ukraine crisis.

First, the ASEAN driven mechanisms have the United States, China and Russia as members of these regional initiatives which are meant to manage the larger context of the Asia-Pacific regional order. While the United States has categorically followed the move towards the Indo-Pacific vision, both China and Russia continue to look at the region as the Asia-Pacific. However, both countries endorse the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which looks at the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean region as two separate entities that are integrated and not as a contiguous whole, leaving a degree of ambiguity in how the evolution of the Indo-Pacific itself is emerging.

Second, one of the critical impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is how the geopolitical environment in Northeast Asia is getting shaped. Russia is as much a Northeast Asian power as it is a European power. Therefore what is happening in Ukraine is not outside the purview of ASEAN, but brings the war closer to ASEAN as the region lies immediately in ASEAN’s vicinity. The emphasis of Russian policy to Northeast Asia has been visible in its “Pivot to Asia” policy. It was to assist Russia develop closer economic ties with several of the Northeast Asian states, and diversifying economic leverage across the region. In some senses it was to broaden Russian integration into the region which was lopsided in favour of China. It also sought to enhance the development of its far eastern regions which were closer to the East Asian states. While trade with China remains the largest, ASEAN amounts for just about US $ 15 billion as on 2020.

Third, Russia remains one of the largest defence exporters to the ASEAN region. In a paper authored by Ian Storey from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, which sites SIPRI as the source, Russia amounts for the largest defence supplies to the region of Southeast Asia amounting to the tune of US $ 10.7 billion for the years 2000-2019. The same study provides the percentage breakdown of Russian defence exports to Southeast Asia where several of the Southeast Asian states are procuring their defence supplies from Russia. This factor impedes ASEAN’s ability to voice a stronger response on the invasion of Ukraine.

ASEAN’s approach to the war in Ukraine needs to be seen from two perspectives. How individual countries have responded and how ASEAN as a grouping has taken a position. While individual member countries have given some statements, the strongest position has come from Singapore which has even placed sanctions on Russia, condemning the attack in no uncertain terms. Calling the issue of sovereignty of an independent state into consideration, Singapore has identified the existential crisis that smaller countries face in the interstate system. Brunei too condemned the war. By comparison even the largest country, Indonesia has been more muted in its response, without any direct reference to Russia but highlighting the importance of sovereignty. Vietnam is too closely allied to Russia to respond; Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines have made very mild comments; and like Laos and Cambodia remained muted while Myanmar supported Russian actions. However, despite this when the UN General Assembly session voted on the Ukraine crisis, eight of the ASEAN members voted in favour of the resolution condemning Russia, while both Vietnam and Laos abstained from the vote.

However, it is critically important to evaluate where the ASEAN is sabotaging itself by choosing this form of strategic silence on the Ukraine crisis. In the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion, the ASEAN statement was an insipid response. It called for respecting the tenets of the UN Charter and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as the principles on which interstate relations need to be based. One of the core principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) , which is drawn from the United Nations Charter is that any efforts to change the territorial integrity of a state by force by another country is deemed illegal in interstate relations. The TAC clearly endorses this principle which is the basis of ASEAN’s regional cooperation. The TAC also states that non-interference in domestic affairs is a key principle of the ASEAN. It is critical to understand that while several of the ASEAN mechanisms are not capable of addressing the Ukraine crisis, the EAS was distinct because the TAC was a condition for membership to the EAS. The Russian Federation acceded to the TAC in 2004 itself, and later became part of the EAS mechanism too. The ASEAN statement did not categorically look at how the Russian invasion went against its accession to the TAC, thereby flouting the conditions for the membership to the EAS. Instead it merely called for “all relevant parties to exercise maximum restraint”. This was a critical opportunity lost by ASEAN to re-emphasize the centrality of the grouping by stating clearly that as a member of the EAS, Russian action had violated the principles of the TAC to which it had acceded.

Centrality which emerged as a key plank of ASEAN’s external engagement in the aftermath of the Cold War, saw the processes extend outwards to include several dialogue partners. The key was to keep the regions mechanisms as the plank for interstate interactions in the wider Asia-Pacific region, bringing the ASEAN core as the pivot for the regional processes that engaged both small, middle and major powers, thereby seeking to create a web of interactions both at the economic and security levels of cooperation. Furthering the core space for confidence building was a key plank, which however, has not been able to progress beyond that. Confidence building has remained limited to dialogue and interactions, without efforts to address preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, which weakens ASEAN centrality in conflict situations. This has been amply evident in several of the regional issues such as the South China Sea, Myanmar’s military coup and in the recent Ukraine war. ASEAN’s choice of strategic silence and its centrality are incompatible with one another.

Professor Shankari Sundararaman is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.