The most recent Quad meeting held in Melbourne in the second week of February, indicates a continued focus on the regional dynamics shaping the Indo-Pacific region. This meeting comes in the aftermath of two key events that are critical: first, the growing ties between China and Russia, which will implicate how the Indo-Pacific region itself will be shaped. Second, relates to the growing tensions between an expanding NATO and Russia which is clearly visible in the Ukraine standoff and compels the Quad’s larger focus on what is the normative order – not just in the Indo-Pacific, but within the global order itself. For the US and its allies, the focus on the normative order and its impact on how global geopolitics is shaped will remain a critical area of concern.

The move towards furthering China-Russia ties was evident at the opening of the winter Olympics when both countries set a new pace for their bilateral ties, clearly identifying the core aspects of their relations vis-à-vis the west. The emphasis was critically placed on the terms “no-limits” and “no forbidden areas”, which indicated that the two would focus on converging interests, with clear reference to the relationship moving beyond the earlier limits of the cold war period. There is a clear parallel that is visible in how the ties between the US, China and Russia have played out - even as the Sino-Soviet spilt of the 1960s allowed for deepening of the US China ties during the Cold war, the current US-China rivalry has created the space for furthering China Russia ties, with its incumbent implications on how global geopolitics is being shaped. A close reading of the two Joint Statements reveal an interesting emphasis on critical areas that compel a deeper understanding of the complexities of the geopolitical shifts.

Three important points emerge in the China Russia Joint Statement that reiterate the significance of the bilateral ties between the two, how it impacts the Quad and the Indo-Pacific region. First, is the emphasis placed on the term democracy, where the Joint Statement repeatedly uses the word democracy clearly stating that there is “no one size fits all” approach to democratic model of governance. This point states that countries have different histories, cultural characteristics and forms of evolution, where the prescription of a universal democratic model is not the correct one. This is of critical interest to the Quad which has been called a “democratic diamond” or the `democratic security diamond’ as stated by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in early years of its conception. Pushing the Quad as a democratic grouping will alienate the Quad from the ASEAN states, furthering a vertical divide in the Indo-Pacific. This explains why the Quad’s second iteration indicates a convergence founded upon the revisionist tendencies that China has shown and the emphasis on the maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

Second, the Joint Statement highlights how the AUKUS has significantly changed the regional security architecture and is responsible for moving the region closer to a new cold war era by reviving security driven alliances. Addressing the region as the Asia-Pacific, the statement highlights how the impact of nuclear submarine technology in the region undermines the agreed upon safeguards for security and sustainability. However, the assertions of China vis-à-vis the ASEAN states in the maritime waters and the relevance of the UNCLOS in resolving the South China Sea dispute find no mention in the Joint Statement. Regardless of China’s constant endorsement of the UNCLOS in all the ASEAN driven processes, the reference to the Law of the Seas is missing. Russia has taken a more ambiguous view of Chinese claims to the nine-dash line, clearly revealing the dichotomy in the bilateral ties on this issue.

Third, Russian support for the recognition of a one China policy with regards to Taiwan is emphatically reiterated, bringing the focus on China’s grand strategy and revisionist approach in the Indo-Pacific. The recent tensions over the Taiwan issue and the repeated threat of force from the Chinese side have increased regional tensions over China’s unilateral behavior in the wider region. Furthermore the two sides opposed the expansion of NATO within Europe brining the focus on US relations with Russia, indicating the geopolitics at the systemic level. However, it stopped short of any clear support by China on Russia’s Ukraine issue, revealing yet another dichotomy in the ties between the two.

By contrast, the Joint Statement of the Quad meeting addressed key areas of cooperation among the members such as the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines pledged by the member countries. Emphasizing the oft repeated adherence to international law and the salience of the 1982 UNCLOS, the Quad once again pushed the member countries to reiterate the convergences upon which the Quad was conceived in addressing challenges to the maritime order, particularly over concerns in the South China Sea and the East Sea.

However, the Joint Statement of the Quad does not reflect the discussions over the Ukraine crisis which is indicative of the larger shifts taking shape in global geopolitics, where the United States, China and Russia are striving to establish their individual positions at the systemic level. The focus on the Ukraine crisis and the challenge it poses to the normative order has undoubtedly seen a difference of approach among the Quad members. While both Australia and Japan have stood on the side of their foremost ally, the United States, India’s position on the Ukraine crisis is driven by a more nuanced policy which factors in its close relations with Russia. India’s position at the UNSC on the Ukraine crisis called for `quiet and constructive diplomacy’ to resolve the crisis, which is based on the significance and complexity of its relations with both the United States and Russia. India’s position at best reflects the tenets of its multi-alignment policy, where it will focus its strategic autonomy on areas of convergence while simultaneously taking a more realpolitik position with regard to its national interest. India’s position also seeks to balance its relations between China and Russia itself, given the stress that it has with China in recent times and the reliance of its long held ties with Russia.

Professor Shankari Sundararaman is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.