Even as the new calendar year began, Cambodia assumed the chair of ASEAN, bringing the debate back on critical issues at play within the regional matrix. ASEAN’s chair is by rotation, where one of the member countries takes over as chair for that particular year. The core objective of the ASEAN chair is to set the agenda for that particular year and to allow for the continuity of agenda set in place by the grouping in the previous year.

The two core issues crippling the ASEAN over the past year therefore take importance, as ASEAN has to show a concerted effort in addressing these – first, the political turmoil within Myanmar which continues to evade any acceptable resolution and second, the continued tensions that surround the territorial claims in the South China Sea where Chinese assertions are critically pulling the ASEAN cohesion apart.

The Myanmar situation, by far, remains the most intractable of the problems that ASEAN is currently facing. With little leverage to address the domestic situation in any of its member countries, ASEAN’s only recourse is to opt for exerting some kind of moral pressure upon the Myanmarese military leadership to move towards a more inclusive reconciliation process, with all stakeholders being respected in terms of the political outcome. However, this is fraught with difficulties because the military is not become a legitimate stakeholder since it came to power by overthrowing an elected government. Addressing a national reconciliation with the current leadership is tantamount to accepting the military coup.

Prime Minister Hun Sen’s visit to Myanmar in the first week of January was slated as a bilateral visit, to further relations between the two countries. The meeting with General Min Aung Hliang was received with ambiguity among the ASEAN leaders, especially since the ASEAN’s five point consensus resolution has been largely ignored by the military leadership within Myanmar. Concerns over the weakening of the ASEAN resolve may be a critical issue as the agenda set through the last year may lose its continuity, while Cambodia seeks to accommodate the military, which some consider would be a de facto rejection of the ASEAN’s five point proposal. It also belies the regional security interest as supporting the Myanmar military is a process that divides the regional states into tighter camps of democratic and authoritarian models of governance. Moreover, there is little headway that Prime Minister Hun Sen himself can make in easing the political situation in Myanmar, as Cambodia’s standing on matters of democracy and domestic political freedoms remains far from exemplary.

Much debate has also centered on the leadership that Cambodia exhibited during the 2012 summit where the grouping came to the forefront of regional issues as being unable take an united stand, particularly on the South China sea dispute, leading to criticisms on ASEAN inability to drive the regional agenda. In 2012, issues affecting both Vietnam and the Philippines created the fault-line along which the regional grouping floundered that was later resolved through back channel diplomatic efforts. The pressing challenges of the South China Sea and the maritime tensions have only exacerbated with little headway being made to address the completion of the Code of Conduct (CoC).

The growing tensions over the Ream naval base where China is said to have acquired secret access, has geopolitical implications in the wider region, bringing Cambodia’s close ties with China under constant scrutiny. As the regional balance is getting tilted, smaller states are coming under pressure to side with China as the leverage on economic ties is fast shifting in China’s favour. Nowhere is this better visible than in the Cambodian case, where the continued leverage of China is evident in the domestic and foreign policy matters.

The implication of this on the ASEAN for this coming year is critical. While a year may not be long in reality, the policies that have been set in place can be undermined during this period, putting the regional agenda on the back foot, if Cambodia chooses to push its bilateral agenda over the multilateral one that benefits the region. Moreover, the Myanmar visit signals that the current Chair, Cambodia, and the ASEAN members are at odds over the ASEAN policy to shape the political outcomes in Myanmar. This was best demonstrated by the fact that the foreign ministers’ retreat that was to be held last week did not convene. Ostensibly the reason for the postponement was the Omicron variant of the pandemic, which made an in person meeting more difficult to conduct. However, like several of the ASEAN events over the past two years this could have been held through video conference.

This has some critical implications because the meeting was to endorse the next ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar. As Chair of the ASEAN, the selection of an envoy by Cambodia would need the approval of the remaining members. The selection of Prak Sokhonn, Cambodia’s foreign minister as the next special envoy remains in a limbo leaving even less space for any multilateral approach to the Myanmar discord.

While ASEAN has often been a divided house on several matters, considering that it has ten members that are of diverse perspectives, it has been able to achieve the promotion of a regional agenda that has held the grouping in good stead. Increasingly as major power rivalry and competition has evolved in the regional matrix, the role of individual ASEAN states and how they drive forward the agenda of the regional grouping is coming under the scanner. Cambodia’s position is an unenviable one – on the one hand it remains the foremost ally of China in the region and on the other it needs to follow an independent course of action vis-à-vis agenda setting on regional issues as a member of the ASEAN. The best approach for Cambodia would be to leverage the multilateral approach where regional issues are concerned, reducing the impact on divisiveness and moving to diversify its dependence on China.

Professor Shankari Sundararaman is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.