Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s week-long visit to India, from October 9 to 16, is a groundbreaking event in India-Afghanistan relations. Muttaqi, who was facing a travel ban under the United Nations’ sanctions, was able to travel to New Delhi after the UN temporarily lifted the travel ban. This is the first ministerial visit by any Afghan minister since the Taliban took over in August 2021.

The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan has presented a dilemma for India. Until 2021, India had actively participated in the economic and infrastructural development of Afghanistan. Even after the Taliban takeover, India has been careful to concentrate its engagements with the Afghan people, although not granting recognition to the Taliban regime.

However, non-recognition of the Taliban regime has not prevented India from engaging with the political dispensation in Kabul. In recent times, India has ramped up its interaction with the Taliban regime. Earlier this year, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Muttaqi in Dubai in January. In May, External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar held telephonic talks with his Afghan counterpart. Kabul had shown solidarity with New Delhi following the Pakistan-sponsored terror attack in Pahalgam in April.

New Delhi had developed close ties with Kabul since the fall of the previous Taliban regime in 2001. However, the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021 has created challenges for India as well as certain opportunities. It is usual to view India-Afghanistan relations through the narrow prism of Pakistan; Pakistan remains a common security concern for both India and Afghanistan. But there are several other dimensions to the India–Afghan relationship beyond Pakistan.

First, on the occasion of Muttaqi’s visit India elevated its technical mission in Kabul to the status of an embassy. Although it will be headed by a chargé d’affaires for the time being, this is a major step indicating Afghanistan’s importance to India. Further, it may pave the way for Afghanistan to re-start its embassy in India thereby strengthening interactions between the two countries.

Second, Afghanistan is crucial to India’s outreach to Central Asia, Eurasia and beyond. India has been developing connectivity initiatives like the Chabahar Port in Iran and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). These projects enable India to circumvent Pakistan and reach Afghanistan, Central Asia and Eurasia with the possibility to extend up to Europe. Security and stability in Afghanistan is essential for smooth operation of India’s projects. Greater cohesion with the Taliban regime over shared security threats serves India’s economic and strategic interests in South and Central Asia.

Third, Kabul could become a vital component of New Delhi’s diplomatic maneuvering. Recent friction with the United States has seen India trying to counterbalance ties with the US by engaging closely with forums like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Though this does not mean a full thaw with China or distancing from the US, India has been nimble-footed in its balancing act while trying to protect its own interests. In a recent Moscow meeting India opposed establishment of foreign military structures in Afghanistan, implying a negation to the US’s proposal of taking charge of the Bagram military base.

While Afghanistan is central to India’s strategic interests, there are significant challenges to this bilateral relationship. Muttaqi’s itinerary in India includes a visit to the Darul Uloom Deoband madrassa (religious seminary). Darul Uloom Deoband’s ideology and interpretation of Islam serve as a foundational influence for the Taliban’s ideology. In the late 1970s and 1980s several madrassas mushroomed along the Pakistan-Afghan border which adhered to the teachings of Deoband. These teachings formed part of the Deoband sect of Islam and were instrumental in training the Afghans who became the Mujahideens fighting the Soviets. Years later the Mujahideens transformed into the Taliban, predecessor to the current regime. India will need to skilfully balance between its opposition to radical Islam and engaging with the Taliban.

India will also need to balance its interests in Afghanistan with concerns over the Taliban’s record on human rights and women’s rights. While External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar did not raise human rights with Muttaqi on this visit, India has in the past, along with the US, condemned human rights violations in Afghanistan.

India must also remain mindful that geopolitical compulsions drive its engagements with the Taliban regime. During the previous Taliban regime (1996–2001), India had supported the Northern Alliance, a group fighting the Taliban. India’s strategic interests—including preventing Afghanistan from falling entirely under China’s influence—are shaping its adjusted posture. Engaging with the Taliban does not equal recognition, but it does reflect pragmatic recalibration.

Even while engaging with the Taliban, India has consistently stopped short of according recognition to their regime. India’s approach to Afghanistan remains dominated by a focus on the Afghan people. However, by upgrading the status of its mission in Kabul to embassy level, India is indicating that it is also prepared to deal with the Taliban regime and expand its engagements. Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to India is therefore an important step for both countries as they seek to recalibrate ties amid regional geopolitical turbulence.

Mr. Niranjan Marjani is a political analyst and researcher based in Vadodara, India.