Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held telephonic talks with the head of the Sudan Sovereign Council General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan on 13 December 2024 and conveyed that his country is willing to mediate in the dispute between Sudan and the UAE. Türkiye’s offer comes in the backdrop of tensions prevailing between Sudan and the UAE.

Sudan is riddled with conflict since April 2023 when fighting broke out between its military and paramilitary. Friction was simmering between Sudan’s military the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo who is also known as Hemedti. The two factions have been at odds with each other over controlling the state and its resources.

In this conflict, al-Burhan has accused the UAE of supplying weapons to the rival RSF and thereby prolonging the war in Sudan. For its part, the UAE has rejected these accusations.

Erdoğan’s offer to mediate between Sudan and the UAE comes only days after Ankara hosted Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. In this meeting the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to end their nearly year-long dispute. The dispute between the two erupted in January this year when Ethiopia, a landlocked country in the Horn of Africa, entered into an agreement with Somaliland, Somalia’s breakaway region, to lease a coastline for use as a port and a military base.

By playing the role of a peacemaker, Türkiye is looking to strengthen its already strong presence across Africa. Apart from having deep engagements with Sudan and Somalia, Türkiye is also a major player in Libya. In 2020, Türkiye intervened in Libya to support the Government of National Accord against the forces of the Libyan National Army. There have been reports of Türkiye leasing the port of Khoms in northwestern Libya for 99 years which the two sides have not confirmed. However, Libya is an important country for Türkiye’s presence in North Africa.

Türkiye’s maneuvering across Africa, in particular North Africa, could be considered from three perspectives. First, with continuing involvement in Africa, Türkiye is projecting itself as a major power in the region and a competitor to countries like Russia, China and the United States (US). Türkiye’s approach to Africa is a part of its wider foreign policy where it attempts to maintain an independent stand. Türkiye is a NATO member and has close ties with China as well as Russia. Recently Türkiye had tried to join the BRICS that is considered as an anti-West grouping. Türkiye often displays a trend of playing one side against the other to leverage its own position and benefit from both the sides. This was evident in Türkiye’s eagerness to join the BRICS as a bulwark against the EU for not responding to Türkiye’s applications for an EU membership. In Africa too, Türkiye is pursuing its independent strategy which could be viewed as a competition to major powers.  

Second, despite its intentions to expand outreach across Africa, Türkiye has limited resources compared to China, Russia and the US. This causes Türkiye to usually engage with countries that have a very fragile political structure. Some of the examples are Libya, Somalia and Sudan. These countries are in continuous conflict since more than a decade. The conflict has also created factions within these countries. Türkiye’s engagement is in the form of supporting one side against the other as is evident in case of Libya and Sudan. The fault lines existing in these fragile states provide Türkiye with space to stamp its footprint.

Third, in its accelerated outreach to the African countries Türkiye senses an opening to compete for the leadership position in the Muslim world. There has been a long-standing rivalry between the Arab Gulf States, Iran and Türkiye to assume leadership of the Islamic countries. With Iran weakened due to constant conflict with Israel, Türkiye would look to push its claim. In the discord between Sudan and the UAE, Türkiye gets an opportunity to counter the UAE. Though in the past few years, the ties between Ankara and Abu Dhabi have thawed, the former could still find this opportunity to compete with the latter in the Middle Eastern politics irresistible. At present the control of the SAF is mostly restricted to Khartoum while the RSF holds a considerable part of the Sudanese territory including Darfur. By supporting the SAF, Türkiye is indirectly challenging the influence of the UAE in Sudan, whether proven or otherwise. The situation in Sudan could provide another chance to Türkiye to advance its goal of seeking leadership position in the Muslim world. In October, during a Joint Summit of the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the Arab League in Riyadh Türkiye’s criticism of Muslim countries for not supporting the Palestinian cause enough was also an attempt to discredit the Arab States as the leaders of the Islamic world.

Türkiye has long been engaged in different sub-regions of Africa, in particular North Africa and the Horn of Africa. The recent developments in these sub-regions are creating a space for Türkiye to further push for greater influence across the entire Middle East and North Africa region.

Mr. Niranjan Marjani is a political analyst and researcher based in Vadodara, India.