The Horn of Africa, a sub-region in the eastern part of Africa, with its strategic location in the western Indian Ocean, is witnessing an increasing degree of geopolitical competition with the involvement of regional and extra regional powers.

At the heart of this sudden spike in strategic activity in the region is the naval deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia. On January 1 this year, Ethiopia entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland. This MoU allows Ethiopia with sea access of 20 kilometres along the Somaliland coast for the next 50 year. Ethiopia also plans to construct a naval base there. In return, Ethiopia agreed to recognize Somaliland as an independent state. No other country in the world has yet accorded this recognition to Somaliland.

For Ethiopia, this deal is important and likely to benefit Ethiopia its eonomy which has been struggling to recover in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Further the Tigray war which has gone on for more than two years has also contributed to Ethiopia’s economic woes.

Somalia is upset over these developments as it considers this deal as an attack on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Although this issue could be perceived as a territorial dispute between neighbouring countries, it has elements that involve regional and international geopolitics.

First, the Ethiopia-Somaliland naval deal has had a deteriorating effect on Egypt’s relations with Ethiopia which have already not been cordial for a long time. The Egypt-Ethiopia discord has its roots in the dispute over sharing the waters of Nile River.

For its part, Egypt has been opposed to the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt cites agreements of 1929 (between Egypt and Britain) and 1959 (between Egypt and Sudan) which guarantee Egypt two-thirds of Nile’s waters along with the right to veto any upstream project. Due to these agreements Egypt was able to build Aswan Dam which led to agricultural development and hydroelectricity generation.  

Ethiopia sought to gain similar economic benefits for which it developed the GERD that was completed in 2023. According to Egypt, Ethiopia ignored this right when it unilaterally went ahead with the construction of the GERD. Ethiopia’s apparent neglect of the Nile River agreements has increased the friction with Egypt since last one year.

Egypt’s other concerns are that implementation of the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland would lead to Ethiopia gaining access to a port in the Red Sea thereby becoming a power in the Horn of Africa. This development in turn would lead to Ethiopia presenting a strategic challenge to the Suez Canal route.

The deal between Egypt and Somalia facilitates the former to station Egyptian soldiers in Somalia and cooperating with their Somali counterparts. While Egypt maintains that the goal of stationing troops in Somalia is in line with the renewed African Union stabilization force in Somalia, Ethiopia has expressed its displeasure of this arrangement. Ethiopia has termed that the Egypt-Somalia military deal would lead to instability in the region. While Egypt could present its deal with Somalia as a deterrent against Ethiopia, this deal allows Egypt to strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean Region.

Second, the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland has also indirectly accorded Türkiye with an opportunity to strengthen its outreach in the Horn of Africa. In July this year, Ankara agreed to send naval support to Somalia to explore oil and gas in Somali waters. This development has also come following the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

Since the past two decades, Türkiye’s foreign policy has been increasing its focus on Africa. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Ankara is aggressively pursues African countries. After cooperating initially in the areas of humanitarian aid, education and culture, Türkiye later cultivated military ties with the African countries. In 2017, Türkiye established Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu. This is Türkiye’s largest military facility overseas.

Closer ties with Mogadishu enable Türkiye to compete with the Arab States like the UAE that have deep engagements with the countries in the Horn of Africa. Besides, naval outreach to Somalia also enhances Türkiye’s presence in the Indian Ocean Region.

The Horn of Africa, a region which was long identified with non-traditional security threat like piracy, is now becoming a geopolitical hotspot as regional and extra regional powers are scrambling to engage with the countries in this region to get a foothold in the strategically important Indian Ocean Region. Egypt’s and Türkiye’s accelerated outreach to Somalia has now accorded an international dimension to the geopolitics in Horn of Africa. These recent developments now facilitate countries like Egypt and Türkiye greater opportunities to navigate in the wider expanse of the Indian Ocean Region.

Mr. Niranjan Marjani is a political analyst and researcher based in Vadodara, India.