External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar visited Iran on January 15-16. The visit comes at a time when the Israel-Hamas war is dragging on for over three months since October 2023. It is also causing a major disruption in the global economy as supply chains dependent on safe and secure passage through the North Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Bab El-Mandeb Strait stand affected. Further the attacks on cargo ships in the Red Sea by Houthis of Yemen, as response to Israel’s attacks on Hamas, have exacerbated the crisis with the war now spilling over to the Indian Ocean Region.

The Houthis are a Yemen-based group of Shia denomination and are backed by Iran which is a Shia-majority country. The Houthis form a part of what is termed as Iran’s Axis of Resistance in the Middle East and receive military and financial support from Iran. Apart from the Houthis, Hezbollah in Lebanon is supported by Iran and are currently engaged in conflict with Israel along the Israel-Lebanon border.

Escalation of attacks by the Houthis in the Red Sea has led to disruption of oil and non-oil shipments in the region. To avoid being hit by Houthis’ missile and drone attacks, a number of shipping companies are re-routing their ships by circumventing the Red Sea and taking a longer route by sailing around the Cape of Good Hope.

In this backdrop it is pertinent to consider whether Dr. Jaishankar’s visit to Iran is an indication of a reset in India-Iran relations. India’s ties with Iran have witnessed a dramatic downturn in the past few years, particularly since 2018. In the overall canvas of India’s outreach to the Middle East, ties with Iran stand in stark contrast to India’s engagements with the Gulf Arab States. However, India’s ties with the Arab countries have never had any negative bearing on the former’s ties with Iran. The India-Iran relations have always being subjected to India’s relations with the United States and more importantly the United States’ relations with Iran.

The India-Iran ties have a history of going through a rough patch parallel to India upgrading its engagements with the United States at different points of time. This was evident during India’s negotiations with the United States over nuclear deal between 2005 and 2008 when India voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency. India’s ties with Iran were relatively steady when the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) and the European Union started from 2015. The United States pulled out of the negotiations in 2018 and declared imposition of sanctions on countries purchasing oil from Iran. India stopped its oil purchases from Iran since May 2019 to avoid these sanctions.

While the Middle East has been subject to conflict and competition between Iran and the Gulf Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it has never cast shadow on India’s oil purchases from the region. Even between 2015 and 2018, when Iran’s ties with Saudi Arabia had deteriorated, both countries were top oil suppliers to India.  

In the present context, India’s outreach gains significance since the United States and the United Kingdom are engaged in a military conflict with the Houthis which are identified as Iran’s proxies. Although Iran is not in direct confrontation with the United States, continued conflict in the Red Sea jeopardizes India’s economic and strategic interests.

India is also engaged in development of Chabahar Port in Iran, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the recently announced India-Middle East Europe Economic Corridor. These connectivity projects are India’s gateways to Central Asia, Eurasia and Europe.

The prolonged confrontation with the West has y pushed Iran closer to China which has now emerged as not only a major buyer of Iranian oil but also an investor in Iran’s infrastructure projects. Disruption in sea-lanes of communication in the Middle East is an indirect boost to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project. Iran and Central Asian countries would look for connectivity alternative which China provides through its networks of railways and highways connecting China, Central Asia and Türkiye. It implies that India’s outreach to Central Asia, meticulously carried out for the past decade, has hit a roadblock at least for the time being.

India’s outreach to Iran is timely as the war is continuously spilling over to a wider geography. Through this engagement India has once again positioned itself as a power that could directly or indirectly contribute to de-escalation or peace efforts. India, until now, has restrained from calling out Iran directly for the crisis in Red Sea which indicates leaving space for negotiation. On Iran’s part, resumption of oil purchases by India is a preferable outcome in near future as it would reduce the former’s overdependence on China.

Despite its close ties with the West, India has continuously maintained dialogue with Iran. The current outreach could result in India taking more pronounced actions in resetting its ties with Iran, something that was not prioritized since 201

Mr. Niranjan Marjani is a political analyst and researcher based in Vadodara, India.