An international portal has recently reported that Indonesia’s Badan Keamanan Laut or Bakamla, one of the country’s maritime bodies that is in charge of safety and security tasks, is forging a cooperation amongst its Southeast Asian counterparts to contain Chinese activities in the South China Sea. It said that Indonesia had invited officials dealing with the subjects from five other countries in the region to meet early next year to discuss how to respond to China’s assertiveness in the area.

Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam were countries listed by Bakamla to the meeting which would be conducted in February 2022 to “share experiences and foster brotherhood” among the countries facing similar challenges posed by China. The media hinted that those countries, already convened previously in an ASEAN Coast Guard Forum last October, signaled their willingness to cooperate. The institution’s maneuver thus triggered appreciation from Indonesian MPs, public figures and maritime securities experts who were so far critical to what had been persistently conducted by China in the water territory.

Bakamla’s intention at certain level is acceptable but it nevertheless has substantial flaws which in the next turn can be ruining its institutional credibility. Consequently, it is also possible to damage Indonesia formal position that is a non-claimant in the South China Sea dispute. This article is to highlight what the agency might have missed in its action to mobilizing ASEAN coast guards to contain Beijing’s aggressiveness in SCS.

First, it seems that Bakamla has no prior consultation with the ministry of foreign affairs for the idea would not have come out if it doing so. As mentioned earlier, Indonesia has no direct friction with China in the area because it is not a claimant state. That’s why the ministry has never publicly been criticizing whatever actions made by China in South China Sea because there is no actual Indonesian interest troubled. Only parties like Bakamla, Indonesian MPs among other that are very reactive to repetitiously assault Beijing for its putative misconducts in SCS.

Second, from ASEAN member states that will be invited to Bakamla’s planned meeting (said by some analysts similar to the ASEAN Coast Guard forum participants) mostly are China’s rivals or at least they are grouped as the claimant parties in the South China Sea dispute. Only Singapore, and Indonesia of course, that are totally neutral in the conflict. This means the agency may be using the association’s big name for an overtly anti-China campaign.

Third, Bakamla’s idea of mobilizing its counterparts to contain China can be considered substantively as its effort to win domestic political, social supports rather than an honest way to mitigate the existing conflict in the water. At the time the planned meeting is launched to the public the board is simultaneously struggling to gather more legal power through an executive order or locally dubbed PP (for Peraturan Pemerintah) initiated by the office of Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal and Security. But the draft has to go a long way and therefore a leverage must be needed to boost the administrative process. The South China Sea conflict is a suitable issue to play for that.

In internal realm Bakamla is judged having low on capabilities and this deficit stems from its controversial institutional background. The agency was hurriedly set up during the last stages of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration after its requirement was deliberated in the House of Representatives for over two years. That time it was hailed by the local maritime communities as the panacea for Indonesia’s complicated, inefficient and shipping players-burdening maritime security management.

Bakamla was set to conduct coast guard tasks like law enforcement at sea, maritime search and rescue operations and others as stipulated in Law No. 32/2014 on Maritime Affairs. This legal basis is weak because in Indonesia legal system every law regulates a certain sector with all its ramification. Bakamla legal foundation is outside the remit of the criteria and its designation (maritime affairs) is completely generic. Subsequently, President Joko Widodo issued Presidential Regulation No. 178/2014 to make Bakamla operational on December 13, 2014.

In the last six years, the agency has submitted a bill on Maritime Security to the Parliament but did not get traction from the House of Representative although it is considered as one of top priority bills to be discussed immediately. Since it was dropped the agency is also continuously lobbying domestic political entities to support them with another form legal status, i.e. PP, which is eagerly championed by the office of Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal and Security.

Although its legal status is far from perfect for a maritime security and safety institution, Bakamla nevertheless is acquiring assets (patrol boats, bases/command centers). According to the Agency’s white paper, it currently manages three maritime zones with headquarters in Ambon and Manado of North Sulawesi province. These offices are supported by 20 bases –both stationary and mobile– established across the archipelago. All of the facilities are equipped with electronic devices to read distress signal through global maritime distress safety system/GMDSS and ship identification information via automatic identification system/AIS. Other vessel tracking systems are also in place.

Fourth, the agency’s initiative will make maritime security/safety within ASEAN frameworks longer if can be moved forward. On the other side the existing mechanisms are not yet exhaustively used to settle problems in the scope. Furthermore, there are basically a lot of extra ASEAN fora, for instance Head of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) of which Bakamla is one of its constituency, which may be utilized to the settle the conflict. So it is totally weird why Bakamla thinks that ASEAN still needs another platform for the issues.

The author is totally confident that the idea to mobilize ASEAN coast guards to contain China’s aggressiveness in South China Sea by Bakamla is not worth to ponder. We need to double check it with the ministry of foreign affairs as the master of Indonesia’s international policymaker.

Mr. Siswanto Rusdi is director of National Maritime Institute (NAMARIN), an independent think tank in Jakarta.